Missolonghi Invested by Sea and Land

The command of the lagoons was of vital importance to the besieged.

Continuing Siege of Missolonghi,
our selection from History of Greece from the Conquest by the Romans to the Present Times by George Finlay published in 1864. The selection is presented in six easy 5-minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in Siege of Missolonghi.

Time: 1825
Place: West coast of Greece

The besieged now met with the first great trial of their firmness. They were eagerly awaiting the arrival of the fleet under Miaulis, which they fondly expected would compel Reshid to raise the siege. On July 10th several vessels were descried in the offing. Their joy reached the highest pitch, and they overwhelmed the advance-guard of the besiegers, which consisted of Albanians, with insulting boasts. Soon, however, fresh ships hove in sight, and it was evident that the fleet was too numerous and the ships too large to be Greek. The red flag became visible on the nearest brigs, and gradually the broad streaks of white on the hulls, and the numerous ports, showed plainly both to Greeks and Turks that this mighty force was the fleet of the Captain-Pacha. The besieged were greatly depressed, but their constancy was unshaken.

Reshid now assumed the offensive with great vigor. He introduced a number of flat-bottomed boats into the lagoon, gained possession of the islands of Aghiosostis and Procopanistos, which the Missolonghiots had neglected to fortify, and completely invested the place both by sea and land. On July 28th he made a determined attack on the bastion Bozzaris, and on August 2nd he renewed the assault by a still more furious attempt to storm the bastion Franklin, in which a breach had been opened by his artillery; but both these attacks were gallantly repelled. Before the assault on the bastion Franklin, Reshid offered terms of capitulation to the garrison of Missolonghi. His offers were rejected, and, to revenge his defeat, he ordered Rutsos and some other prisoners to be beheaded before the walls. The cruisers of the Captain-Pacha informed him that the Greek fleet was approaching, before this was known to the be sieged, and he made the assault on August 2nd, with the hope of carrying the place before its arrival.

The Greek fleet, consisting of forty sail of the best ships that Greece still possessed, under the command of Miaulis, Sactures, Colandruzzos, and Apostoles, was descried from Missolonghi on August 3rd. Next day the Ottoman fleet maneuvered to obtain an advantageous position. The Hydriot squadron in the end succeeded in getting the weather-gage of the advanced ships of the Turks; yet the Greeks, in spite of this success, could not break the line of the main division, which consisted of twenty-two sail. Three fire-ships were launched in succession against the Captain-Pacha’s flag-ship; but this mode of attack no longer threw the Turks into a panic terror, and they maneuvered so well that the blazing vessels drifted harmless to leeward without forcing them to break their line of battle. Chosref was, nevertheless, so intimidated by the determined manner in which the Greeks directed their attacks against his flag that he avoided a second engagement. He claimed the victory in this indecisive engagement merely because he had escaped defeat, and he made his orders to effect a prompt junction with the Egyptian fleet a pretext for sailing immediately for Alexandria. His cowardice left the flotilla of Reshid in the lagoon without support, and as the Greeks captured one of the transports laden with powder and shells for the army before Missolonghi, the besiegers were again inadequately supplied with ammunition for their mortars.

The command of the lagoons was of vital importance to the besieged. It was necessary to secure their communication with the fleet, and to prevent their being deprived of a supply of fish, which formed a considerable portion of their food. The Turks were not deprived of the advantages they had gained without a severe contest, but the skill of the Missolonghiot fishermen, who were acquainted with all the passages through the shallow water and deep mud, secured the victory, and, with the assistance of some Hydriot boats sent by Miaulis to their aid, the flotilla of Reshid was destroyed, and his Albanians were driven from the posts they had occupied in the islands. Five of the flat-bottomed boats were captured, and the Greeks recovered the command of the whole lagoon. The fleet then sailed in pursuit of the Captain-Pacha, leaving eight ships to keep open the communications between the besieged and the Ionian Islands, and prevent any sup plies being sent by sea to the besieging army.

Reshid was now placed in a very difficult position. He received bis supplies of provision with irregularity, both from Patras and Prevesa. His stores of ammunition were so scanty that he could not keep up a continuous fire from his guns and was compelled to abandon the hope of carrying the place by an artillery attack. He had no money to pay his troops and was unable to prevent great numbers of the Albanians from returning home, though he allowed all who remained double rations. On the other hand, the prospects of the besieged were very favor able. They felt confident that Reshid would be forced to raise the siege at the approach of winter, for they daily expected to hear that a Greek army had occupied the passes in his rear. It seemed therefore to be certain that if he persisted in maintaining his position, his army must perish by want and disease. The armatoli of Romelia, who had quitted the Peloponnesus after their defeats at Navarin, were said to be marching into the mountains behind Lepanto, whose rugged surface is familiar to classic readers from the description which Thucydides has left us of the destruction of the Athenian army under Demosthenes.

Reshid weighed his own resources and estimated the activity of the Greek irregulars with sagacity. His guns could not render him much service, but he still believed that the spade would enable him to gain possession of Missolonghi before winter. To effect his purpose he adopted a singular but, under the circumstances in which he was placed, by no means an ill-devised method of covering the approach of a large body of men to the counterscarp of the ditch. He set his army to raise a mound by heaping up earth, and this primitive work was carried forward to the walls of the place in defiance of every effort which the besieged made to interrupt the new mode of attack.

[* He was not present at this second siege.]

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