Parkman Vol. 6-1, Chapter 8

He tried to escape; but his vessel was seized and moored under the guns of the town, and it is needless to say that his mission was a failure.

Our special project presenting the definitive account of France in Canada by Francis Parkman, one of America’s greatest historians.

Previously in A Half-Century of Conflict, Volume 1. Beginning Chapter 8.

Military aid from Old England to New, promised in one year and actually given in the next, was a fact too novel and surprising to escape the notice either of friends or of foes.

The latter drew strange conclusions from it. Two Irish deserters from an English station in Newfoundland appeared at the French post of Placentia full of stories of British and provincial armaments against Canada. On this, an idea seized the French commandant, Costebelle, and he hastened to make it known to the colonial minister. It was to the effect that the aim of England was not so much to conquer the French colonies as to reduce her own to submission, especially Massachusetts, — a kind of republic which has never willingly accepted a governor from its king.[1] In sending ships and soldiers to the “Bastonnais” under pretence of helping them to conquer their French neighbors, Costebelle is sure that England only means to bring them to a dutiful subjection. “I do not think,” he writes on another occasion, “that they are so blind as not to see that they will insensibly be brought under the yoke of the Parliament of Old England; but by the cruelties that the Canadians and Indians exercise in continual incursions upon their lands, I judge that they would rather be delivered from the inhumanity of such neighbors than preserve all the former powers of their little republic.”[2] He thinks, however, that the design of England ought to be strongly represented to the Council at Boston, and that M. de la Ronde Denys will be a good man to do it, as he speaks English, has lived in Boston, and has many acquaintances there.[3]

[1: Rapport de Costebelle, 14 Octobre, 1709. Ibid., 3 Décembre, 1709.]

[2: “Je ne les crois pas assez aveugles pour ne point s’apercevoir qu’insensiblement ils vont subir le joug du parlement de la vieille Angleterre, mais par les cruautés que les Canadiens et sauvages exercent sur leurs terres par des courses continuelles je juge qu’ils aiment encore mieux se délivrer de l’inhumanité de semblables voisins que de conserver toute l’ancienne autorité de leur petite république.” — Costebelle au Ministre, 3 Décembre, 1710. He clung tenaciously to this idea, and wrote again in 1712 that “les cruautés de nos sauvages, qui font horreur à rapporter,” would always incline the New England people to peace. They had, however, an opposite effect.]

[3: It is more than probable that La Ronde Denys, who had studied the “Bastonnais” with care, first gave the idea to Costebelle.]

The minister, Ponchartrain, was struck by Costebelle’s suggestion, and wrote both to him and to Vaudreuil in high approval of it. To Vaudreuil he says:

Monsieur de Costebelle has informed me that the chief object of the armament made by the English last year was to establish their sovereignty at Boston and New York, the people of these provinces having always maintained a sort of republic, governed by their council, and having been unwilling to receive absolute governors from the kings of England. This destination of the armament seems to me probable, and it is much to be wished that the Council at Boston could be informed of the designs of the English court, and shown how important it is for that province to remain in the state of a republic. The King would even approve our helping it to do so. If you see any prospect of success, no means should be spared to secure it. The matter is of the greatest importance, but care is essential to employ persons who have the talents necessary for conducting it, besides great secrecy and prudence, as well as tried probity and fidelity. This affair demands your best attention, and must be conducted with great care and precaution, in order that no false step may be taken.”

[Ponchartrain à Vaudreuil, 10 Août, 1710. Ponchartrain à Costebelle, même date. These letters are in answer to the reports of Costebelle, before cited.]

Ponchartrain could not be supposed to know that while under her old charter Massachusetts, called by him and other Frenchmen the government of Boston, had chosen her own governor, New York had always received hers from the court. What is most curious in this affair is the attitude of Louis XIV., who abhorred republics, and yet was prepared to bolster up one or more of them beyond the Atlantic, — thinking, no doubt, that they would be too small and remote to be dangerous.

Costebelle, who had suggested the plan of warning the Council at Boston, proceeded to unfold his scheme for executing it. This was to send La Ronde Denys to Boston in the spring, under the pretext of treating for an exchange of prisoners, which would give him an opportunity of insinuating to the colonists that the forces which the Queen of England sends to join their own for the conquest of Acadia and Canada have no object whatever but that of ravishing from them the liberties they have kept so firmly and so long, but which would be near ruin if the Queen should become mistress of New France by the fortune of war; and that either they must have sadly fallen from their ancient spirit, or their chiefs have been corrupted by the Court of London, if they do not see that they are using their own weapons for the destruction of their republic.

[Costebelle à Ponchartrain, 3 Décembre, 1710.]

La Ronde Denys accordingly received his instructions, which authorized him to negotiate with the “Bastonnais” as with an independent people and offer them complete exemption from French hostility if they would promise to give no more aid to Old England either in ships or men. He was told at the same time to approach the subject with great caution, and unless he found willing listeners, to pass off the whole as a pleasantry.[4] He went to Boston, where he was detained in consequence of preparations then on foot for attacking Canada. He tried to escape; but his vessel was seized and moored under the guns of the town, and it is needless to say that his mission was a failure.

[4: Instruction pour Monsieur de la Ronde, Capitaine d’Infanterie des Détachements de la Marine, 1711. “Le dit sieur de la Ronde pourroit entrer en négociation et se promettre de faire cesser toutes sortes d’hostilités du côté du Canada, supposé que les Bastonnais promissent d’en faire de même de leur côté, et qu’ils ne donassent aucun secours à l’avenir, d’hommes ni de vaisseaux, aux puissances de la vieille Angleterre et d’Ecosse.”]

The idea of Costebelle, or rather of La Ronde, — for it probably originated with him, — was not without foundation; for though there is no reason to believe that in sending ships and soldiers against the French, England meant to use them against the liberties of her own colonies, there can be no doubt that she thought those liberties excessive and troublesome; and, on the other side, while the people of Massachusetts were still fondly attached to the land of their fathers, and still called it “Home,” they were at the same time enamored of their autonomy, and jealously watchful against any abridgment of it.

While La Ronde Denys was warning Massachusetts of the danger of helping England to conquer Canada, another Frenchman, in a more prophetic spirit, declared that England would make a grave mistake if she helped her colonies to the same end. “There is an antipathy,” this writer affirms, “between the English of Europe and those of America, who will not endure troops from England even to guard their forts;” and he goes on to say that if the French colonies should fall, those of England would control the continent from Newfoundland to Florida. “Old England” — such are his words — “will not imagine that these various provinces will then unite, shake off the yoke of the English monarchy, and erect themselves into a democracy.”[5] Forty or fifty years later, several Frenchmen made the same prediction; but at this early day, when the British provinces were so feeble and divided, it is truly a remarkable one.

[5: “La vieille Angleterre ne s’imaginera pas que ces diverses Provinces se réuniront, et, secouant le joug de la monarchie Anglaise, s’érigeront en démocratie.” — Mémoire sur la Nouvelle Angleterre, 1710, 1711. (Archives de la Marine.)]

The anonymous prophet regards the colonies of England, Massachusetts above all, as a standing menace to those of France; and he proposes a drastic remedy against the danger. This is a powerful attack on Boston by land and sea, for which he hopes that God will prepare the way. “When Boston is reduced, we would call together all the chief men of the other towns of New England, who would pay heavy sums to be spared from the flames. As for Boston, it should be pillaged, its workshops, manufactures, shipyards, all its fine establishments ruined, and its ships sunk.” If these gentle means are used thoroughly, he thinks that New England will cease to be a dangerous rival for some time, especially if “Rhodelene” (Rhode Island) is treated like Boston.

[“Pour Baston, il faudrait la piller, ruiner ses ateliers, ses manufactures, tous ses beaux établissements, couler bas ses navires, … ruiner les ateliers de construction de navires.” — Mémoire sur la Nouvelle Angleterre, 1710, 1711. The writer was familiar with Boston and its neighborhood and had certainly spent some time there. Possibly he was no other than La Ronde Denys himself, after the failure of his mission to excite the “Bastonnais” to refuse co-operation with British armaments. He enlarges with bitterness on the extent of the fisheries, foreign trade, and ship-building of New England.]

While the correspondent of the French court was thus consigning New England to destruction, an attack was preparing against Canada less truculent but quite as formidable as that which he urged against Boston. The French colony was threatened by an armament stronger in proportion to her present means of defense than that which brought her under British rule half a century later. But here all comparison ceases; for there was no Pitt to direct and inspire, and no Wolfe to lead.

The letters of Dudley, the proposals of Vetch, the representations of Nicholson, the promptings of Jeremiah Dummer, agent of Massachusetts in England, and the speech made to the Queen by the four Indians who had been the London sensation of the last year, had all helped to draw the attention of the ministry to the New World, and the expediency of driving the French out of it. Other influences conspired to the same end, or in all likelihood little or nothing would have been done. England was tiring of the Continental war, the costs of which threatened ruin. Marlborough was rancorously attacked, and his most stanch supporters the Whigs had given place to the Tories, led by the Lord Treasurer Harley, and the Secretary of State St. John, soon afterwards Lord Bolingbroke. Never was party spirit more bitter; and the new ministry found a congenial ally in the coarse and savage but powerful genius of Swift, who, incensed by real or imagined slights from the late minister, Godolphin, gave all his strength to the winning side.

The prestige of Marlborough’s victories was still immense. Harley and St. John dreaded it as their chief danger and looked eagerly for some means of counteracting it. Such means would be supplied by the conquest of New France. To make America a British continent would be an achievement almost worth Blenheim or Ramillies, and one, too, in which Britain alone would be the gainer; whereas the enemies of Marlborough, with Swift at their head, contended that his greatest triumphs turned more to the profit of Holland or Germany than of England.[6] Moreover, to send a part of his army across the Atlantic would tend to cripple his movements and diminish his fame.

[6: See Swift, Conduct of the Allies.]

St. John entered with ardor into the scheme. Seven veteran regiments, five of which were from the army in Flanders, were ordered to embark. But in the choice of commanders the judgment of the ministers was not left free; there were influences that they could not disregard. The famous Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, lately the favorite of the feeble but willful queen, had lost her good graces and given place to Mrs. Masham, one of the women of her bedchamber. The new favorite had a brother, John Hill, known about the court as Jack Hill, whom Marlborough had pronounced good for nothing, but who had been advanced to the rank of colonel, and then of brigadier, through the influence of Mrs. Masham; and though his agreeable social qualities were his best recommendation, he was now appointed to command the troops on the Canada expedition. It is not so clear why the naval command was given to Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker, a man whose incompetence was soon to become notorious.

From A Half-Century of Conflict, Volume 1, Chapter 8 by Francis Parkman

Volume 6 of Parkman’s History of France in North America titled “A Half-Century of Conflict” was itself published in two volumes. This means that “Volume 6” (consistent with how past books published on this website were called) must be called “Part 6”, instead – to avoid confusion. This book is Volume 1 of “A Half-Century of Conflict”. The next book in the series will be called “Part 6, A Half-Century of Conflict, Volume 2”.

The below is from Francis Parkman’s Preface to this book.

This book, forming Part VI. of the series called France and England in North America, fills the gap between Part V., “Count Frontenac,” and Part VII., “Montcalm and Wolfe;” so that the series now forms a continuous history of the efforts of France to occupy and control this continent.

In the present volumes the nature of the subject does not permit an unbroken thread of narrative, and the unity of the book lies in its being throughout, in one form or another, an illustration of the singularly contrasted characters and methods of the rival claimants to North America.

Like the rest of the series, this work is founded on original documents. The statements of secondary writers have been accepted only when found to conform to the evidence of contemporaries, whose writings have been sifted and collated with the greatest care. As extremists on each side have charged me with favoring the other, I hope I have been unfair to neither.

The manuscript material collected for the preparation of the series now complete forms about seventy volumes, most of them folios. These have been given by me from time to time to the Massachusetts Historical Society, in whose library they now are, open to the examination of those interested in the subjects of which they treat. The collection was begun forty-five years ago, and its formation has been exceedingly slow, having been retarded by difficulties which seemed insurmountable, and for years were so in fact. Hence the completion of the series has required twice the time that would have sufficed under less unfavorable conditions.

BOSTON, March 26, 1892

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