Belgium’s Grievances

Such were the sources of Belgian grievances; such the difficulties the Government had to surmount.

Continuing Revolution in Belgium,
our selection from an article in Great Events by Famous Historians, Vol. 16 by Thomas Colley Grattan published in 1905. The selection is presented in seven easy 5-minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in Revolution in Belgium.

Time: 1830

Reverting to four great facts of history with reference to the fate of Belgium, it must be borne in mind that it was by force she submitted to the dominion of the four powers to whom during the last two centuries she was joined: To Spain, by the Treaty of Westphalia, in 1648; to Austria, by that of Utrecht, 1713; to France, by that of Campo Formio, 1797; to Holland, by that of London, 1814; and that therefore she was not bound in allegiance to any of those powers by any ties sanctioned by the laws of reason or justice.

No sooner was the decree promulgated which established the existence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands than a course of misgovernment began, which it may be necessary shortly to capitulate.

The fundamental law, rejected by the majority of the Belgian notables, was forced upon the people. The nationality of Holland being considered as the basis of the Kingdom, every measure was regulated on it, without reference to the wishes, the wants, or the prejudices of Belgium. The Dutch language was considered as the national and official medium of communication. The great establishments of the Government were fixed in Holland. The reforms in the civil and criminal law were in accordance with Dutch, not Belgian views. The system of taxation was accordant with Dutch interests. Preference was given to the Dutch in the nominations to all civil and military posts. The laws and their administration were stamped with a marked anti-Catholic tendency. Finally, the whole nature of the Government was that of the old stadtholders ‘ régime, disguised under monarchical denominations; a power said to be limited but considering itself irresponsible.

The representative system, which was established in the new kingdom, became an instrument for the imposition of Dutch supremacy. The population of Belgium was, in round numbers, double that of Holland. The number of representatives was, however, equal; and repeated trials of strength in the Chamber of Deputies gave the following results:

All the laws that pressed heavily on the interests and liberties of Belgium were carried by a Dutch majority. Every such law, when rejected, was supported by a large number of Dutch members. All the proposed laws favorable to Belgian interests that were not carried failed through Dutch majorities. All such propositions as passed into laws were opposed by a formidable Dutch majority.

Such were the sources of Belgian grievances; such the difficulties the Government had to surmount. But the grievances themselves were aggravated and increased a thousand-fold by the temptations offered to the Government to push them into oppression. Had a ruler of large and enlightened views, seconded by a ministry of practical talent, given his conscientious energy to the amelioration of mischievous legislation, the list of evils above enumerated would not have been enough to force a people into revolt, or to justify it in the eyes of the world at large. But, independently of the faults of William, and of Van Maanen and his other instruments of misgovernment, there was in the construction of the new State one positive evil, which human ingenuity could scarcely have overcome. That evil was the disproportion of population between the two divisions of the kingdom, considering, as they unfortunately did, their interests totally dis tinct. It was a manifest but an unavoidable injustice to Belgium to give her but the same number of Deputies as were allowed to Holland. Yet, had the representation of Belgium been proportioned to her population, she would assuredly have ac quired that supremacy which she so loudly complained of when exercised by Holland; and the latter would have become, by the force of things, what Belgium had been pronounced to be by the folly of diplomacy, “an increase of territory.”

The absolute establishment of the Kingdom of the Nether lands (so constituted) on a permanent footing of equalized nationality was perhaps impossible. But that such a kingdom might have been constructed, effectual for the intended purpose of the one which fell to pieces, there is no doubt. To raise up a barrier between France and Germany, a real balance of European power, was the design of the Congress of Vienna (in 1814), which had the materials for construction in its hands, but possessed no head sufficiently clear and disinterested to plan and execute the work. Had a great principle of forethought or a freedom from the desire of personal aggrandizement guided the counsels of the allies, the Rhenish provinces had been, without doubt, included with Holland and Belgium in the formation of that barrier kingdom, which, as it was constructed, was but a piece of frail and perishable patchwork. Had such an element as those provinces been added to the imperfect combination, a self-righting action had been certainly superinduced, an internal umpire had existed when difficulties of self-government arose, and a balance of national interests and feelings would have been created that must have rendered the perpetual collision of petty passions and small jealousies impossible. The advantages of such a wholesale scheme to Europe at large may be hereafter discovered. Suffice it to say here that such a combination would have turned to the best account the dismemberment of Napoleon’s enormous Empire, by giving one great and solid pledge to European peace, instead of frittering away so vast a guarantee into three unsettled, discontented fragments.

During fifteen years the Kingdom of the Netherlands struggled on through a frequently shifting atmosphere of political light and shade. Abandoned in a great measure by the rest of Europe to its own action, scarcely capable of appreciating its own situation, dazzled at times by certain false and forced indications of prosperity, oppressed at others by exaggerated fears of ill, agitated by antagonistic interests and passions, it presented the most violent contrasts, and was to foreign observers most difficult of comprehension.

King William had acquired a reputation for sagacity and liberality by some acts springing rather from constitutional than from moral causes. His plain manners and domestic habits were joined to an indifference to the pomps of royalty, and he wandered about the streets and wards, a daylight adventurer, without much dignity of bearing and none at all of purpose. The personal character of William had certainly a considerable influence on the secondary causes which led to the Belgian Revolution of 1830. He never forgot his Dutch origin and the stadtholderate principles of his ancestors. He always considered Holland as his country, and Belgium but as a part of his possessions. His constant efforts were directed to condense in himself the whole action of the Government, to mix himself up in every operation of finance and industry, to check and humiliate the nobility, and to ingratiate himself with the commercial and manufacturing classes by large loans of the public money.

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