Franch Take Algiers

This series has two easy 5 minute installments. This first installment: Barbary Pirate King Goes Too Far.

Introduction

By the capture of Algiers, capital of Algeria, on the northern coast of Africa, the French began their empire in Africa. In common with other countries, France had often warred against the Algerine pirates, who with their fellow-corsairs of the Barbary States long preyed upon the commerce of nations.

Although in 1815 an expedition under Decatur gave the death-blow to Algerine piracy against the United States, other countries still suffered from its depredations. In 1816 Algiers was bombarded and destroyed by the British, who compelled the Dey to liberate all his Christian slaves and to promise for the future to treat prisoners of war according to European usage.

While the United States and England thus accomplished important objects, for themselves and other nations, against the Algerines, France not only had grievances of long standing, but also received fresh provocations, and the consequences that followed proved far more serious to the piratical State than those resulting from the action of the former countries. The capture of Algiers, related below, was one of the most striking events in the history of European dealings with the Barbary States.

This selection is from The Tricolor on the Atlas: or, Algeria and the French Conquest by Francis Pulszky published in 1854. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Francis Pulszky (1814-1897) was a Hungarian politician and writer.

Time: 1830
Place: Algiers

In 1818 a French brig was plundered in Bona, and the Government of Algiers refused to indemnify the owners. In 1823 the house of the French consular agent was violated by the Algerine authorities, under the pretext of searching for smuggled wares, and no satisfaction was given. Roman vessels, sailing under the protection of the French flag, had been taken by Algerine corsairs. At last a rough insult was alleged as the ultimate cause of war — the way in which the Dey had treated the French consul publicly before the Divan. Bakri, a rich Jew of Algiers, had supplied the French commissariat with grain at the time of the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1798, and Bakri’s accounts had not been settled. In 18 16 a commission was named to sift the claims of the Algerian creditor.

The commission acknowledged the justice of the claim, which amounted to about fourteen million francs; but that sum was reduced by consent, in 1819, to seven million, with the stipulation that the French creditors of Bakri were first to be satisfied; and, in fact, several of them, influential persons at court and in the chambers, got their money. But the principal creditor of Bakri was the Dey himself, who had sold to him a considerable quantity of wool, and who looked upon the debt of France as the guarantee of his debtor. The rumor was spread that many of the French claims which had been paid by the first instalment were fictitious, and Deval, the French consul in Algiers, was suspected of being in secret understanding and partnership with some of the French claimants. This opinion prevailed both in France and in Africa. The Dey, seeing that the value of Bakri’s guarantee was day by day decreasing, wrote an autograph letter to the King of France. The letter remained without answer. The Dey, therefore, when in 1827 he publicly received the foreign consuls at the Bairam feast, asked Deval for the reason of that silence. The consul answered in words conveying the idea that the King of France could not lower himself so much as to write to a Dey of Algiers. At any rate, it is believed that Deval, either from his deficient knowledge of the Arabic or from hastiness of temper, used expressions offensive to the Dey. The Moor Hamdan-ben-Othman-Khodja, who was present at the scene, assures us that the reply of the con sul was literally the following: “The King of France does not think a man like thee worthy of an answer.” The Dey was maddened by such insulting language; and, with a flyflap which he just happened to hold in his hand, he slapped the face of the consul, bursting out into a disrespectful speech against the King of France. Deval made his report to his Government. It was M. Villele who at that time stood at the head of the Ministry, and the opposition had often charged him with weakness and cowardice toward foreign powers. M. Villele, therefore, seized the opportunity of displaying cheap energy and silencing the op position. He declared that the King would take revenge for such an insult; and the blockade of the harbor of Algiers was decreed, but it remained without result. The Ministry of Polignac, wishing to turn the attention of the nation to foreign affairs, and believing that military glory might blind the French to the restrictions of the press which were intended by the Government, resolved to send the memorable expedition to Africa.

On May 25, 1830, a fleet, consisting of a hundred men-of-war, among them eleven line-of-battle ships and twenty-four frigates, and of three hundred fifty-seven vessels hired for transport, weighed anchor from the road of Toulon. It carried an army of thirty-four thousand one hundred eighty-four men, the officers included. The commander of the fleet was Vice-Admiral Duperre, who had the reputation of being the best and most experienced French naval officer. The army was led by Lieutenant-General Bourmont, Minister of War, whose precedents did not justify the nomination, and whose name could not inspire the soldiers either with confidence or with courage, neither of which, however, was deficient. Many of the officers had served in the wars of the Republic and of the Empire, and were accustomed to enemies more terrible than the undisciplined hordes of savage Africans. Besides, the army had always been honored by the French youth, and it won fresh favor when they saw that it had a nobler task than the dry uniformity of drilling and barrack life. Many volunteers, admirers of the deeds of Napoleon, entered the ranks, not a few of them young men of wealth and education. They introduced a good spirit into the army, and communicated their fresh enthusiasm even to the more rough or apathetic of the common soldiers.

On the morning of June 13th the fleet came in sight of the African coast, and landed on the sandy shores of Sidi-Ferruh, thus called from the tomb of a Marabout, twenty-five miles west of Algiers. The landing began on the 14th at dawn, and everybody expected a considerable resistance from the enemy; but only a few hundred mounted Arabs were seen in the distance, who seemed to spy the movements of the fleet. Scarcely was the first division, under the command of General Berthezene, on shore, when it marched in columns against the enemy, who had taken position upon a hill at about half an hour’s distance from the sea, and had covered it by his batteries. They opened fire, but could not check the advance of the French. At that moment, General Bourmont, who hastened onward to lead the attack himself, had a narrow escape; two balls fell at his feet, and covered him with sand. As the French approached the batteries, the janizaries fled; all their artillery was taken by the victors.

General Bourmont had much too favorable an opinion of African tactics. He expected to have to encounter a cavalry similar to that of the Mamelukes in Egypt. He had even announced to the army, in an order of the day, dated from Palma, that the enemy were to send a mass of camels into the first line of battle, with a view to intimidate the French horse; but only a few of those animals were seen at a distance, carrying the bag gage of the Turks. The dreaded African cavalry avoided every encounter; their method of warfare was a succession of skirmishes. The horsemen advanced suddenly, one by one, stopped their horses, discharged their long muskets, and rode away as suddenly as they had come, in order to charge their muskets again and to repeat the maneuver. The Algerine army was commanded by the son-in-law of the Dey, Ibrahim, the aga of the militia, a man without capacity. It amounted to thirty thou sand men, one-fourth of them being the auxiliaries brought by the beys of the provinces. The Algerine Turks amounted to about five thousand men; the remainder were Arabs of the Metidja, and Kabyles from the Jurjura mountain, mostly of the Flissa tribe, and led by their kaid, Ben-Zamun.

As soon as the army had taken position on the coast, it built a fortified camp, as the over-prudent Bourmont did not dare immediately to attack the city. Since there was abundance of green trees in the neighborhood, green huts and halls soon rose by the industry of the French soldiers. The camp looked like a city and was enlivened by merry movement. In the meantime the struggle continued uninterruptedly at the outposts; the natives had a superiority in skirmishing over the French, because their muskets were of a longer range; but they dreaded the artillery, especially the howitzers. As often as a shell exploded, the crowds of horsemen dispersed in all directions.

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