The Hartford Convention

This series has six easy 5 minute installments. This first installment: Peace Movement Against the War of 1812.

Introduction
Although this gathering of New England men long since became mainly a subject of “academic” discussion among historical critics, it was nevertheless an event of much political significance at the time when such a strong protest was uttered against the war policy of President Madison, so disastrous to New England commerce. As shown in the following accounts, the principal question raised for historians by the action of the convention concerns its attitude regarding a possible dis solution of the Union.

The Hartford Convention (so called from the place of its meeting, Hartford, Connecticut) was held December 15, 1814, to January 5, 1815. It was composed of twelve delegates from Massachusetts, seven from Connecticut, four from Rhode Island, two from New Hampshire, and one from Vermont. The conditions that led to the calling of the convention, its proceedings, which were carried on in secret, and the grounds upon which have rested the suspicious of its ” treasonable ” designs, are clearly and impartially set forth below.

The selections are from:

• Great Events by Famous People, Volume 15 by Simeon E. Baldwin published in 1905.
• The History of Massachusetts by John S. Barry published in 1857.

For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

There’s 3.5 installments by Simeon E. Baldwin and 2.5 installments by John S. Barry.

We begin with Simeon E. Baldwin (1840-1927). He was Governor of Connecticut, Senator, and when not otherwise occupied, a law professor.

Time: 1814
Place: Hartford, Connecticut

The last days of the Federalists were not their best days. The vigor with which they carried through the adoption of the Constitution, and the dignity with which they at first ad ministered the government, seemed to desert them as they approached what Jefferson and his friends used to call the “Revolution of 1800.” Personal rival1ies and misunderstandings among their leaders, unworthy intrigues, if not to make C. C. Pinckney President instead of Adams, yet certainly to make Burr President instead of Jefferson; bitterness in opposition, which almost overcame love of country — these make up the miserable chapter which closes the history of a great party.

It is now many years since John Quincy Adams brought forward the charge that some leading Federalists of Massachusetts were and had long been plotting the secession from the Union of the Northern or at least the New England States. The many additions, of late, to American political biography, and the growing frankness and unreserve with which the private letters of a public man are now published, almost before the grave has closed over him, have placed the present generation in a position to judge intelligently of the truth of this accusation. That it was not without some foundation is now plain, but that it was pressed too far seems hardly less so.

The person most active in pushing the scheme for a separation seems to have been Timothy Pickering. Soured by political disappointments and pecuniary embarrassments, when he found himself in 1803 returned by Massachusetts to the Senate of the United States, he could not bear the sight of Jefferson in power.

“Apostasy and original depravity,” he writes to George Cabot in January, 1804, “are the qualifications for official honors and emoluments while men of sterling worth are displaced and held up to popular contempt and scorn. And shall we sit still, until this system shall universally triumph; until even in the Eastern States the principles of genuine Federalism shall be overwhelmed? This is a delicate subject.

“The principles of our Revolution point to the remedy — a separation. That this can be accomplished, and without spilling one drop of blood, I have little doubt. One thing I know, that the rapid progress of innovation, of corruption, of oppression, forces the idea upon many a reflecting mind. The people of the East cannot reconcile their habits, views, and interests with those of the South and West. The latter are beginning to rule with a rod of iron. Some Connecticut gentlemen — and they are all well informed and discreet — assure me that, if the leading Democrats in that State were to get the upper hand — which would be followed by a radical change in their unwritten constitution — they should not think themselves safe, either in per son or property, and would therefore immediately quit the State. I do not believe in the practicability of a long-continued union. A Northern confederacy would unite congenial characters and present a fairer prospect of public happiness; while the Southern States, having a similarity of habits, might be left ‘to manage their own affairs in their own way.’ If a separation were to take place, our mutual wants would render a friendly and commercial intercourse inevitable.

“I believe, indeed, that if a Northern confederacy were forming, our Southern brethren would be seriously alarmed, and probably abandon their virulent measures; but I greatly doubt whether prudence should suffer the connection to continue much longer. The proposition would be welcomed in Connecticut; and could we doubt of New Hampshire? But New York must be associated; and how is her concurrence to be obtained? She must be made the center of the confederacy. Vermont and New Jersey would follow of course, and Rhode Island of necessity. Who can be consulted and who will take the lead?”

Many were consulted, but no one was found ready to lead who was able to lead. Cabot sent this letter of Pickering to Fisher Ames, and talked it over with Chief Justice Parsons and Stephen Higginson; but it met with sympathy rather than approval. In Connecticut, apparently, the project was received with greater favor than in Massachusetts. Judge Reeve, the founder of the Litchfield Law School, and a brother-in-law of Aaron Burr, com mitted himself to it unreservedly.

“I have seen many of our friends,” he writes to Senator Tracy in February, 1804, “and all that I have seen, and most that I have heard from, believe that we must separate, and that this is the most favorable moment. The difficulty is, how is this to be accomplished? I have heard of only three gentlemen as yet who appear undecided upon this subject.”

Burr was understood to entertain similar sentiments, as also did Governor Griswold of Connecticut and Senator Plumer of New Hampshire. Griswold writes at length to Oliver Wolcott in March, 1804, on the subject of Burr’s views; looking to him as probably the best man around whom to rally the “Northern interest,” but complaining that he found his expression of his purposes rather Delphic. “I have no hesitation myself,” he adds, “in saying that there can be no safety to the Northern States without a separation from the Confederacy. The balance of power under the present Government is decidedly in favor of the Southern States; nor can that balance be changed or destroyed. The question, then, is, Can it be safe to remain under a government in whose measures we can have no effective agency?

John S. Barry begins here.

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