Gibraltar Needs Supplies

The Spanish Government having gained intelligence of the approach of this powerful force, instantly took measures to attack the expedition before it could arrive at its destination.

Continuing The Siege of Gibraltar 1782,
our selection from The History of Gibraltar and of Its Political Relation to Events in Europe by Frederick Sayer published in 1862. The selection is presented in seven easy 5 minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in The Siege of Gibraltar 1782.

Time: 1782
Place: Gibraltar

At Madrid the news of the disaster was received with dismay; and the King, who was at the palace of Ildefonso, listened to the intelligence in mute despair. The recovery of Gibraltar had been his unswerving aim, and with this repulse almost his last hope was extinguished. In Paris the intelligence was no less unexpected and unwelcome; so certain indeed had the fall of the fortress been considered that a drama illustrative of the destruction of Gibraltar by the floating batteries was acted nightly to applauding thousands.

It has been before remarked that the Duc de Crillon never held that blindly confident opinion of the inventions of D’Arçon which had turned the heads of the two Bourbon courts. He had always urged the necessity of a complete attack by sea, in which the whole fleet should engage, and of which the floating batteries would form an integral part. The French engineer ridiculed this idea, and affirmed that the ships would be destroyed before they could inflict any damage upon the walls.

The result of the attack showed how completely D’Arçon was mistaken. During the day the assistance of the combined fleet was urgently required; but when its cooperation might have turned the tide of victory, an adverse wind arose, and the vessels could not beat up within range of the Rock.

The distinguished part which Captain Curtis had taken in the defense of the fortress ever since he had joined the command drew from General Eliot commendations no less merited than sincere. Writing to Lord Howe on October 15th he says:

Unknown to Brigadier Curtis, I must entreat your lordship to reflect upon the unspeakable assistance he has been in the defense of this place by his advice, and the lead he has taken in every hazardous enterprise. You know him well, my lord, therefore such conduct on his part is no more than you expect; but let me beg of you not to leave him unrewarded for such signal services. You alone can influence his majesty to consider such an officer for what he has, and what he will in future deserve wherever employed. If Gibraltar is of the value intimated to me from office, and to be presumed by the steps adventured to relieve it, Brigadier Curtis is the man to whom the King will be chiefly indebted for its security. Believe me, there is nothing affected in this declaration on my part.”

Again, when on his return to England he was created Lord Heathfield, he expressed his indignation that Curtis only received the honor of knighthood and a pension of five hundred pounds per annum. “It is a shame,” he said, “that I should be overloaded, and so scanty a pittance be the lot of him who bore the greatest share of the burthen.” Such was the unaffected modesty of this great man!

When the confusion arising from their disastrous defeat had subsided in the enemy’s camp, a heavy cannonade was again opened from their lines and advanced works. The firing generally commenced about five or six o’clock in the morning and continued till noon, then for two hours the batteries were silent, but again opened till seven o’clock in the evening, when the mortars took up the fire till daybreak. During the twenty-four hours six hundred shells and about one thousand shots were thrown into the garrison.

Notwithstanding the ill-success which had attended the combined attack, and the signal proof the enemy had received of the impregnable strength of the fortress, the Spaniards did not entirely despair of eventually reducing the place by famine, could the arrival of Lord Howe’s fleet with the convoy be prevented.

In August the English Government, being aware of the vast preparations which had been making in Spain for the siege of Gibraltar, had collected a fleet of thirty-four sail of the line, six frigates, and three fire-ships, under command of Admiral Lord Howe, which was to convoy a flotilla of merchantmen with relief for the garrison.

By September 11th the preparations were completed, and on that day Howe set sail from Spithead with one hundred eighty-three sail, including the convoy, under the command of Vice-Admirals Barrington and Milbank, Rear Admirals Hood and Hughes, and Commodore Hotham.

Hampered by the difficulty of keeping the merchantmen together, and baffled by contrary winds and violent weather, Howe’s passage was unusually slow and tedious.

The Spanish Government having gained intelligence of the approach of this powerful force, instantly took measures to attack the expedition before it could arrive at its destination. For this purpose the combined fleets of Spain and France which lay in the harbor of Algeciras were reinforced, and dispositions were made for intercepting the British ships on their passage through the Straits.

These arrangements had scarcely been completed when, on the evening of October 10th, a fresh westerly wind sprang up in the bay, and toward night gradually increased in violence till it blew a hurricane. Soon the enemy’s vessels were in distress, many were dragging their anchors, and signal-guns were fired for help in rapid succession. Throughout the night the fury of the storm did not abate, and daybreak disclosed the havoc among the squadrons at Algeciras; a ship of the line and a frigate were ashore at Orange Grove, a French liner had suffered great damage to her masts and rigging, and the St. Michael, of seventy-two guns, was discovered close in shore off the Orange Bastion in distress. She was immediately fired at and after having lost four men she was run ashore on the line-wall, and taken possession of by Captain Curtis. Her commander, Admiral Don Juan Moreno, and her crew of six hundred fifty men were landed as prisoners. These misfortunes materially affected the ulterior movements of the combined fleets. In the meantime, Lord Howe had on the 8th of the month arrived off Cape St. Vincent, and a frigate was sent on from there to gain information from the consul at Faro of the enemy’s dispositions. Two days afterward she returned with the intelligence that the combined fleets, consisting of nearly fifty sail, lay at anchor at Algeciras.

Upon the receipt of this news a council of war was held, and clear and stringent orders were afterward issued for the guidance of the masters in charge of the merchantmen, that the convoy might be conducted safely into the harbor of Gibraltar. On the 11th, the fleet passed through the Straits in three divisions, the third and center squadrons in line of battle ahead, the second squadron in reserve; the Victory led ahead of the third squadron.

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