French Fronde Outbreak

This series has six easy 5 minute installments. This first installment: Treaty of Westphalia Ends the Thirty Years War.

Introduction
By the arbitrary impositions of the minister, Cardinal Mazarin, an insurrection was provoked in France whereby Mazarin was temporarily driven from power. This struggle is sometimes called the “War of the Fronde,” and as an episode in French history, although productive of little definite result, it has a dramatic as well as a political interest. It shows the higher French nobility and the representatives of the people arrayed against the party of the court during the early minority of Louis XIV.

“The Fronde” is the name that was given to the anticourt party. The word “fronde” means a sling, and the origin of its use as a party name is attributed to an epigram. Someone is said to have compared the Frondeurs, as the members of the party were called, to children with slings, who let fly stones and then hide or run away.

This outbreak followed closely upon the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War. To Mazarin the great advantages gained by France through that treaty were mainly the further divisions in Germany. The whole period is remarkable for its antagonisms and cross — purposes, and these are brought to view by Hassall with much subtlety of insight and felicity of observation.

This selection is from Mazarin by Arthur Hassall published in 1903. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Arthur Hassall (1853-1930) was the historian who wrote The Balance of Power 1715-1789 among other important books.

The Peace of Westphalia constitutes an important epoch in the history of Europe. It marked the close of the struggle in Central and Northern Europe between the Reformation and Counter-reformation movements, and the failure of the attempts of Emperor Ferdinand III to form all Germany into an Austrian and Roman Catholic empire. After the Peace of Westphalia, commercial rather than religious motives regulated the policy of the chief states of Europe. But the peace did not merely mark a revolution in men’s ways of thought; it also signalized a remarkable change in the balance of forces on the Continent. For upward of a century the Hapsburgs, supreme in Vienna and Madrid, and closely united by family ties, had threatened to impose their will upon Europe. After 1648 the danger ceased. The weakness of the Emperor and the strength and independence of the German princes rendered any close union with Spain impossible, while Spain herself, though she struggled till 1659 against her impending fate, was already a declining power.

From another point of view, the Peace of Westphalia had a special interest. It affords an admirable illustration of a successful effort on the part of the German princes to strengthen their own position at the expense of the central power. All over Europe the monarchical principle was being assailed. In Holland the power of the stadtholder depended entirely on the will of the merchant aristocracy; in England a republic was shortly to be established; in Italy the revolt of Masaniello seemed at one time likely to lead to the formation of a Neapolitan government independent of Spain; and even in Russia aristocratic discontent against the Czar existed. Thus the movement in France against Mazarin, which shortly developed into the Fronde struggle, was but one of many similar manifestations of a general tendency all over Europe to attack monarchical institutions.

Mazarin was well aware of the impossibility of checking the general disaffection in France till Austria had been humbled, and therefore he devoted all his efforts to bringing the war to a successful conclusion. The actual congress was not opened at Munster till April 10, 1644, and it was not till the end of 1645 that the negotiations seriously began. The questions to be settled were many and complicated. France and Sweden demanded compensations either in land or money; the Elector of Brandenburg wished to occupy all Pomerania, which the Swedes had seized; the Elector Palatine demanded restoration to his dominions. Then there were innumerable questions dealing with the religious situation, the United Provinces, Italy, Catalonia, Portugal, the constitution of the empire, and the position of the German princes.

Early in the proceedings Mazarin brought forward France as the protector of the ancient German liberties, and so secured the friendship of the imperial towns and the German princes. The Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector of Traeves, and the Duke of Neuburg readily accepted the protection of France. It proved impossible to gain the fickle Duke of Lorraine; it was equally difficult to win over the powerful Elector of Bavaria. Maximilian I of Bavaria had played an important part in the Thirty Years’ War, but from June, 1644, he began to enter into periodical negotiations with Mazarin. The cardinal placed no reliance on these negotiations, which he recognized were meant to sow discord between France and her allies. Consequently it was not till after the battle of Nordlingen, followed later by the devastation of his territory by Turenne, that Maximilian made serious overtures to France. In an atmosphere of intrigue such as existed at Munster, Mazarin did wisely in pressing on military operations.

There is no doubt that the continuation of the war had completely disorganized the financial administration. Various devices such as the toisac had been employed by the government to raise funds, but each attempt had been met by fresh opposition. In 1647 recourse was had to a tax known as the acdit du tarif, which modified the existing regulations upon the entry of provisions into Paris. Great opposition was raised by the Parliament, which still more violently opposed in January, 1648, a tax upon all possessors of lands. A lit de justice was necessary to provide for the requirements of the government.

The operation of the unpopular tax, or rachat, as it was termed, was postponed, and the creation of many new maartres de requates provided a certain amount of money. At the lit de justice, Omer Talon, the intrepid avocat-general, delivered an eloquent oration on the condition of the French peasants. “For ten years, sire,” he said, “the country has been ruined, the peasants reduced to sleep upon straw, their furniture sold to pay taxes. To minister to the luxury of Paris, millions of innocent people are obliged to live upon rye and oat bread, and their only protection is their poverty.” The creation of new maartres de requates was stoutly opposed, but in vain, Broussel distinguishing himself by his attack upon the government.

Thus, while victory was being prepared by Turenne, Conde, and Schomberg, a revolution was breaking out in Paris, and in many other parts of the kingdom resistance to the government was the order of the day. Brittany and Toulouse showed especial audacity in their attacks on government officials. At his wits’ end for money, Emery resolved to demand as a condition of the renewal of the paulette — a tax paid by those officials whose offices were hereditary — a fine of four years’ salary. In the hope of conciliating the Parliament of Paris, the fine was not imposed on that body. The Parliament, however, placed itself at the head of the opposition, and on May 13, 1648, it and the sovereign courts — the chambre des comptes, the cour des aides, and the grand conseil — signed a bond in union, and the courts decided to send representatives to a conference in the chamber of St. Louis. Like Louis XVI, in 1789, the Queen mother endeavored to prevent the meeting of the deputies. Like Louis, she failed in her object, and the court was forced to yield. The Spaniards had taken Courtrai, and it was well to temporize.

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