Humulating Defeat of the Chinese

Today’s installment concludes Opium War of 1840,
our selection from Short History of China by Demetrius Charles Boulger published in 1893.

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Previously in Opium War of 1840.

Some delay at Chinkiangfoo was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of the troops and by the number of sick and wounded; but a week after the capture of that place in the manner described the arrangements for the further advance on Nanking were completed. A small garrison was left in an encampment on a height commanding the entrance to the canal; but there was little reason to apprehend any fresh attack, as the lesson of Chinkiang foo had been a terrible one. That city lay beneath the English camp like a vast charnel-house, its half-burned buildings filled with the self-immolated Tartars who had preferred honor to life; and so thickly strewn were these and so intense the heat that the days passed away without the ability to give them burial, until at last it became absolutely impossible to render the last kind office to a gallant foe. Despite the greatest precautions of the English authorities, Chinkiangfoo became the source of pestilence, and an outbreak of cholera caused more loss in the English camp than befell the main force entrusted with the capture of Nanking.

Contrary winds delayed the progress of the English fleet, and it was not until August 5th, more than a fortnight after the Battle at Chinkiangfoo, that it appeared off Nanking, the second city in reputation and historical importance of the empire, with one million inhabitants and a garrison of fifteen thousand men, of whom two-thirds were Manchus. The walls were twenty miles in length, and hindered, more than they promoted, an efficient defense; and the difficulties of the surrounding country, covered with the debris of the buildings which constituted the larger cities of Nanking at an earlier period of history, helped the assailing party more than they did the defenders. Sir Hugh Gough drew up an admirable plan for capturing this vast and not defenseless city with his force of five thousand men, and there is no reason to doubt that he would have been completely successful, but by this the backbone of the Chinese Government had been broken, and even the proud and obstinate Taoukwang was compelled to admit that it was imperative to come to terms with the English and to make some concessions in order to get rid of them.

The minister Elepoo, who once enjoyed the closest intimacy with Taoukwang, and who was the leader of the peace party, which desired the cessation of an unequal struggle, had begun informal negotiations several months before they proved successful at Nanking. He omitted no opportunity of learning the views of the English officers, and what was the minimum of con cession on which a stable peace could be based. He had endeavored also to give something of a generous character to the struggle, and he had more than once proved himself a courteous as well as a gallant foe. After the capture of Chapu and Woosung he sent back several officers and men who had at different times been taken prisoners by the Chinese, and he expressed at the same time the desire that the war should end. Sir Henry Pottinger’s reply to this letter was to inquire if he was empowered by the Emperor to negotiate. If he had received this authority the English plenipotentiary would be very happy to discuss any matter with him, but, if not, the war must proceed.

At that moment Elepoo had not the requisite authority to negotiate, and the war went on until the victorious English troops were beneath the walls of Nanking. At the same time as these pourparlers were held with Elepoo at Woosung, Sir Henry Pottinger issued a proclamation to the Chinese stating what the British Government required to be done. In this document the equality of all nations as members of the same human family was pointed out, and the right to hold friendly intercourse insisted on as a matter of duty and common obligation. Sir Henry said that “England, coming from the utmost West, has held intercourse with China in this utmost East for more than two centuries past, and during this time the English have suffered ill-treatment from the Chinese officials, who, regarding themselves as powerful and us as weak, have thus dared to commit injustice.” Then followed a list of many of the high-handed acts of Commissioner Lin and his successors.

The Chinese, plainly speaking, had sought to maintain their exclusiveness and to live outside the comity of nations, and they had not the power to attain their wish. Therefore, they were compelled to listen to and to accept the terms of the English plenipotentiary, which were as follows: The Emperor was first of all to appoint a high officer with full powers to negotiate and conclude arrangements on his own responsibility, when hostilities would be suspended. The three principal points on which these negotiations were to be based were compensation for losses and expenses, a friendly and becoming intercourse on terms of equality between officers of the two countries, and the cession of insular territory for commerce and for the residence of merchants, and as a security and guarantee against the future renewal of offensive acts. The first step toward the acceptance of these terms was taken when an Imperial commission was formed of three members, Keying, Elepoo, and Niu Kien, Viceroy of the Two Kiang; and to the last named, as Governor of the Provinces most affected, fell the task of writing the first diplomatic communication of a satisfactory character from the Chinese Government to the English plenipotentiary.

This letter was important for more reasons than its being of a conciliatory nature. It held out to a certain extent a hand of friendship, and it also sought to assign an origin to the conflict, and Niu Kien could find nothing more handy or convenient than opium, which thus came to give its name to the whole war. With regard to the Chinese reverses, Niu Kien, while admitting them, explained that “as the central nation had enjoyed peace for a long time the Chinese were not prepared for attacking and fighting, which had led to this accumulation of insult and dis grace.” In a later communication Niu Kien admitted that the English at Canton had been exposed to insults and extortions for a series of years, and that steps should be taken to insure in future that the people of your honorable nation might carry on their commerce to advantage, and not receive injury thereby.” These documents showed that the Chinese were at last willing to abandon the old and impossible principle of superiority over other nations, for which they had so long contended; and with the withdrawal of this pretension negotiations for the conclusion of a stable peace became at once possible and of hopeful augury.

This ends our series of passages on Opium War of 1840 by Demetrius Charles Boulger from his book Short History of China published in 1893. This blog features short and lengthy pieces on all aspects of our shared past. Here are selections from the great historians who may be forgotten (and whose work have fallen into public domain) as well as links to the most up-to-date developments in the field of history and of course, original material from yours truly, Jack Le Moine. – A little bit of everything historical is here.

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