The Gettysburg Battlefield

The ground over which the conflict of July 2nd was to rage may be thus described.

Continuing Battle of Gettysburg,
with a selection from History of the Southern Rebellion by Orville J. Victor published in 1898. This selection is presented in 7.5 easy 5 minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in Battle of Gettysburg.

Time: July 1-3, 1863
Place: Gettysburg, Pennsylvania

The ground over which the conflict of July 2d was to rage may be thus described: Two roads coming into Gettysburg — one from Emmetsburg on the west and the Baltimore turnpike on the east — form the two sides of a A, their point of junction being on the south side of the village. Cemetery Ridge runs from near the point of junction directly south, dividing the A in two nearly equal divisions. Along this ridge runs the Taneytown road. Thus three roads converge at the point called Cemetery Hill, overlooking the town. Within the angles of these roads the main Union formation was made, on the night of July 1st and during the morning of the 2nd. Culp’s Hill, an important elevation, commanding Cemetery Hill, lay off to the right, between the Baltimore pike and Rock Creek. This was held as the Union extreme right. The general position was one of exceeding strength: the two roads from Taneytown and Emmetsburg, being almost wholly within the Federal lines, offered unusual facilities for rapid intercommunication, with commanding elevations for the artillery. Nor could the location be readily turned, for the two crests called Great and Little Round Top, lying south of Cemetery Ridge, about three miles away, acted as Malakoffs, whose proper armament would give the National army’s left perfect security.

The enemy had Seminary Ridge, which, in its southerly ex tension, enveloped the Emmetsburg road, thus making it feasible to project their right out to Meade’s left, and offering the natural line for a flank movement upon the Federal position. Or, if battle was declined by the Confederates, it gave them an open way to Emmetsburg and Frederick. Hence, while in a strong hold, if the enemy assailed, Meade was in no condition to “cover” Washington and Baltimore.

The morning of July 2nd found the belligerents confronting each other nearly in full force. Lee’s divisions were well on the ground. Of Meade’s army, the Sixth Corps was not up until after noon; but, no assault being offered by Lee prior to that time, it was in season for duty. The Confederates passed the morning in determining their point of attack. Their line, form ing a crescent five miles in length, swept around from Rock Creek, in front of Culp’s Hill, through the town and along the western slope of Seminary Ridge, down to the Emmetsburg road; or, in this order by divisions: Johnson, Early, Rodes of Ewell’s Corps constituting the left; Heth, Pender, and Anderson of A. P. Hill’s corps constituting the center; McLaws and Hood of Longstreet’s corps constituting the right. Meade’s assignment, as determined upon at noon, was: Twelfth Corps (Slocum’s) on Culp’s Hill; then Wadsworth’s division of the First Corps; then what was left of Howard’s Eleventh Corps occupying the cemetery, Doubleday’s and Robinson’s division acting as a reserve at that point; next Hancock’s corps (Second) stretched along Cemetery Ridge; then Sykes’s corps (Fifth) advancing to the Round Top hills, to be conjoined there with Sedgwick’s Sixth Corps.

This gave the Union line a crescent shape, only broken by the elbow-like advance of Sickles’s corps (Third) down to the Emmetsburg road, along which it was drawn to a point west of Round Top, where it was refused toward that height. Thus advanced, of course he offered the true point of attack, which Lee was not long in discovering. The attack was made about 4 pm of the 2nd, at a moment when Meade was viewing the faulty and somewhat dangerous position. He said:

When I arrived on the ground, which I did a few minutes before 4 P.M., I found that General Sickles had taken up a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take — that he had thrown forward his right flank instead of connecting with the left of General Hancock, something like a half or three-quarters of a mile in front of General Hancock, thus leaving a large gap between his right and Hancock’s left; and that his left, instead of being near the Round Top Mountain, was in advance of the Round Top; and that his line, instead of being a prolongation of Hancock’s line, as I expected it would be, made an angle of about 45° with it. I told him that I was very fearful he would be attacked and would lose the artillery, which he had put so far in front, before I could support it, or that, if I undertook to support it, I would have to abandon all the rest of the line which I had adopted — that is, that I would have to fight the battle out there where he was. General Sickles expressed regret, and promptly said that he would withdraw his forces to the line which I had intended him to take. But I told him I was fearful that the enemy would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change of movement. And before I had finished that remark, the enemy’s batteries opened upon him and the action began.”

Referring to his order for attack, Lee said:

In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry the position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy’s right, which had been already partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the Federal line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself for attack. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead to the belief that he would be able ultimately to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark.”

Orville J. Victor begins here. Edward A. Pollard begins here. Abraham Lincoln begins here.

More information here and here, and below.

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