Napoleon Hooks Prussian King

Still the Prussian monarch, who seems now to have taken the command upon himself, endeavoring to supply the want of professional experience by courage, brought up his last reserves.

Continuing Napoleon Crushes Prussia,
our selection from Life of Napoleon Bonaparte by Sir Walter Scott published in 1839. The selection is presented in seven easy 5 minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in Napoleon Crushes Prussia.

Time: 1806
Place: Jena and Auerstadt

Bonaparte neither expected nor received any answer to this missive, which was written under the exulting sensations experienced by the angler when he feels the fish is hooked and about to become his secure prey. Naumburg and its magazines were consigned to the flames, which first announced to the Prussians that the French army had gotten completely into their rear, had destroyed their magazines, and, being now interposed between them and Saxony, left them no alternative save that of battle, which was to be waged at the greatest disadvantage, with an alert enemy, to whom their supineness had already given the choice of time and place for it. There was also this ominous consideration, that, in case of disaster, the Prussians had neither principle nor order nor line of retreat. The enemy were between them and Magdeburg, which ought to have been their rallying-point; and the army of the Great Frederick was, it must be owned, brought to combat with as little reflection or military science as a herd of schoolboys might have displayed in a mutiny.

Too late determined to make some exertion to clear their communications to the rear, the Duke of Brunswick, with the King of Prussia in person, marched with great part of their army to the recovery of Naumburg. Here Davout, who had taken the place, remained at the head of a division of thirty-six thousand men, with whom he was to oppose nearly double the number. The march of the Duke of Brunswick was so slow as to lose the advantage of this superiority. He paused on the evening of the 12th on the heights of Auerstaedt and gave Davout time to reinforce the troops with which he occupied the strong defile of Koesen. The next morning, Davout, with strong reinforcements, but still unequal in numbers to the Prussians, marched toward the enemy, whose columns were already in motion. The vanguard of both armies met, without previously knowing that they were so closely approaching each other, so thick lay the mist upon the ground.

The village of Hassen-Hausen, near which the opposite armies were first made aware of each other’s proximity, became instantly the scene of a severe conflict, and was taken and retaken repeatedly. The Prussian cavalry, being superior in numbers to that of the French, and long famous for its appointments and discipline, attacked repeatedly, and was as often resisted by the French squares of infantry, whom they found it impossible to throw into disorder or break upon any point. The French, having thus repelled the Prussian horse, carried at the point of the bayonet some woods and the village of Spilberg and remained in undisturbed possession of that of Hassen-Hausen.

The Prussians had by this time maintained the battle from eight in the morning till eleven, and being now engaged on all points, with the exception of two divisions of the reserve, had suffered great loss. The generalissimo, Duke of Brunswick, wounded in the face by a grape-shot, was carried off; so was General Schmettau and other officers of distinction. The want of an experienced chief began to be felt, when, to increase the difficulties of their situation, the King of Prussia received intelligence that General Mollendorf, who commanded his right wing, stationed near Jena, was in the act of being defeated by Bonaparte in person. The King took the generous but perhaps desperate resolution of trying whether in one general charge he could not redeem the fortune of the day, by defeating that part of the French with which he was personally engaged. He ordered the attack to be made along all the line and with all the forces which he had in the field; and his commands were obeyed with gallantry enough to vindicate the honor of the troops, but not to lead to success. They were beaten off, and the French resumed the offensive in their turn.

Still the Prussian monarch, who seems now to have taken the command upon himself, endeavoring to supply the want of professional experience by courage, brought up his last reserves, and encouraged his broken troops rather to make a final stand for victory than to retreat in face of a conquering army. This effort also proved in vain. The Prussian line was attacked everywhere at once; center and wings were broken through by the French at the bayonet’s point; and the retreat, after so many fruitless efforts, in which no division had been left unengaged, was of the most disorderly character. But the confusion was increased tenfold when, as the defeated troops reached Weimar, they fell in with the right wing of their own army, fugitives like themselves, who were attempting to retreat in the same direction. The disorder of two routed armies meeting in opposing currents soon became inextricable. The roads were choked up with artillery and baggage-wagons; the retreat became a hurried flight; and the King himself, who had shown the utmost courage during the Battle of Auerstaedt, was at length, for personal safety, compelled to leave the highroads, and escape across the fields, escorted by a small body of cavalry.

While the left of the Prussian army was in the act of com bating Davout at Auerstaedt, their right, as we have hinted, was with equally bad fortune engaged at Jena. This second action, though the least important of the two, has always given the name to the double battle; because it was at Jena that Napoleon was engaged in person.

The French Emperor had arrived at this town, which is situated upon the Sale, on October 13th, and had lost no time in issuing those orders to his marshals which produced the demonstrations of Davout and the victory of Auerstaedt. His attention was not less turned to the position he himself occupied, and in which he had the prospect of fighting Mollendorf and the right of the Prussians on the next morning. With his usual activity he formed or enlarged, in the course of the night, the roads by which he proposed to bring up his artillery on the succeeding day, and, by hewing the solid rock, made a path practicable for guns to the plateau or elevated plain in the front of Jena, where his center was established. The Prussian army lay before them, extended on a line of six leagues, while that of Napoleon, extremely concentrated, showed a very narrow front, but was well secured both in the flanks and in the rear.

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