Napoleon Gathers His Forces

The French advanced, in three divisions, upon the dislocated and extended disposition of the large but ill-arranged Prussian army.

Continuing Napoleon Crushes Prussia,
our selection from Life of Napoleon Bonaparte by Sir Walter Scott published in 1839. The selection is presented in seven easy 5 minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in Napoleon Crushes Prussia.

Time: 1806
Place: Jena and Auerstadt

While Bonaparte assembled in Franconia an army considerably superior in number to that of the Prussians, the latter occupied the country in the vicinity of the river Sale and seemed, in doing so, to renounce all the advantage of making the attack on the enemy ere he had collected his forces. Yet to make such an attack was, and must have been, the principal motive of their hasty and precipitate advance, especially after they had secured its primary object, the accession of Saxony to the campaign. The position which the Duke of Brunswick occupied was in deed very strong as a defensive one, but the means of supporting so large an army were not easily to be obtained in such a barren country as that about Weimar; and their magazines and depots of provisions were injudiciously placed, not close in the rear of the army, but at Naumburg and other places upon their extreme left, and where they were exposed to the risk of being separated from them. It might be partly owing to the difficulty of obtaining forage and subsistence that the Prussian army was extended upon a line by far too much prolonged to admit of mutual support. Indeed, they may be considered rather as dis posed in cantonments than as occupying a military position; and as they remained strictly on the defensive, an opportunity was gratuitously offered to Bonaparte to attack their divisions in detail, of which he did not fail to avail himself with his usual talent. The headquarters of the Prussians, where were the King and Duke of Brunswick, were at Weimar; their left, under Prince Hohenlohe, was at Schleitz; and their right extended as far as Muehlhausen, leaving thus a space of ninety miles between the extreme flanks of their line.

Bonaparte, in the meantime, commenced the campaign, according to his custom, by a series of partial actions fought on different points, in which his usual combinations obtained his usual success; the whole tending to straiten the Prussians in their position, to interrupt their communications, separate them from their supplies, and compel them to fight a decisive battle from necessity, not choice, in which dispirited troops, under baffled and outwitted generals, were to encounter soldiers who had already obtained a foretaste of victory, and who fought under the most renowned commanders, the combined efforts of the whole being directed by the master spirit of the age.

Upon October 8th Bonaparte gave vent to his resentment in a bulletin in which he complained of having received a letter of twenty pages, signed by the King of Prussia, being, as he alleged, a sort of wretched pamphlet, such as England engaged hireling authors to compose at the rate of five hundred pounds sterling a year. “I am sorry,” he said, “for my brother, who does not understand the French language, and has certainly never read that rhapsody.” The same publication contained much in ridicule of the Queen and Prince Louis. It bears evident marks of Napoleon’s own composition, which was as singular, though not so felicitous, as his mode of fighting; but it was of little use to censure either the style or the reasoning of the lord of so many legions. His arms soon made the impression which he desired upon the position of the enemy.

The French advanced, in three divisions, upon the dislocated and extended disposition of the large but ill-arranged Prussian army. It was a primary and irretrievable fault of the Duke of Brunswick that his magazines and reserves of artillery and ammunition were placed at Naumburg, instead of being close in the rear of his army and under the protection of his main body. This ill-timed separation rendered it easy for the French to interpose between the Prussians and their supplies, providing they were able to clear the course of the Saale.

With this view the French right wing, commanded by Soult and Ney, marched upon Hof. The center was under Bernadotte and Davout, with the guard commanded by Murat. They moved on Saalburg and Schleitz. The left wing was led by Augereau against Kolberg and Saalfeld. It was the object of this grand combined movement to overwhelm the Prussian left wing, which was extended farther than prudence permitted, and, having beaten this part of the army, to turn their whole position, and possess themselves of their magazines. After some previous skirmishes, a serious action took place at Saalfeld, where Prince Louis of Prussia commanded the advanced guard of the Prussian left wing.

In the ardor and inexperience of youth, the brave Prince, instead of being contented with defending the bridge on the Sale, quitted that advantageous position to advance with unequal forces against Lannes, who was marching upon him from Graffenthal. If bravery could have atoned for imprudence, the Battle of Saalfeld would not have been lost. Prince Louis showed the utmost gallantry in leading his men when they advanced, and in rallying them when they fled. He was killed fighting hand to hand with a French subaltern, who required him to surrender, and, receiving a sabre-wound for reply, plunged his sword into the Prince’s body. Several of his staff fell around him.

The victory of Saalfeld opened the course of the Saale to the French, who instantly advanced on Naumburg. Bonaparte was at Gera, within half a day’s journey from the latter city, whence he sent a letter to the King of Prussia, couched in the language of a victor — for victorious he already felt himself by his numbers and position — and seasoned with the irony of a successful foe. He regretted his good brother had been made to sign the wretched pamphlet which had borne his name, but which he protested he did not impute to him as his composition. Had Prussia asked any practicable favor of him, he said he would have granted it; but she had asked his dishonor, and ought to have known there could be but one answer. In consideration of their former friendship, Napoleon stated himself to be ready to restore peace to Prussia and her monarch; and, advising his good brother to dismiss such counsellors as recommended the present war and that of 1792, he bade him heartily farewell.

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