Farragut Captures New Orleans

This series has thirteen easy 5 minute installments. This first installment: Confederate Defenses of New Orleans.

Introduction
The geography of North America shows the Mississippi River system to be highest importance to the economy of the United States. New Orleans, located at the mouth of the river controls traffic from entering or leaving the river system to the sea-lanes of the world. Thomas Jefferson had declared that whoever owned New Orleans would automatically be an enemy of the United States. So, he took it over himself in the Louisiana Purchase. When the state of Louisiana seceded from the Union and joined the Confederacy, New Orleans passed to an actual enemy of the United States. The Union states in the Mid-West lost their direct access to the sea.

New Orleans was arguably the most strategically valuable place in the American Civil War. The north assigned David Farragut of the nave to take it.

This selection is from Admiral Farragut by Alfred Thayer Mahan published in 1892. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) remains one of the foremost naval historians of all time. His books are required reading for anyone who wants to know about naval warfare,

Time: April 25 to May 1, 1862
Place: Mouth of the Mississippi River

The two forts which constituted the principal defenses of New Orleans against a naval attack from the sea were at Plaquemine Bend, about twenty miles above the Head of the Passes; by which name is known the point where the main stream of the Mississippi divides into several channels, called passes, through which its waters find their way to the Gulf. The river, whose general course below New Orleans is southeast, turns at Plaquemine Bend northeast for a mile and three-quarters, and then resumes its previous direction. The heavier of the two works, Fort Jackson, is on the right bank, at the lower angle of the Bend. It was a casemated brick structure, pentagonal in form, carrying in barbette over the casemates twenty-seven cannon of and above the size of thirty-two pounders, besides eleven twenty-four pounders. In the casemates were fourteen of the latter caliber. Attached to this fort, but below it, was a water battery carrying half a dozen heavy cannon. Fort St. Philip was nearly opposite Fort Jackson, but somewhat below it, so as to command not only the stream in its front, but also the stretch down the river, being thus enabled to rake vessels approaching from below before they came abreast. It comprised the fort proper and two water batteries, which together mounted forty-two guns. The sites of these fortifications had been skillfully chosen; but their armaments, though formidable and greatly superior to those of the fleet–regard being had to the commonly accepted maxim that a gun ashore is equivalent to four afloat–were not equal to the demands of the situation or to the importance of New Orleans. Out of a total of one hundred and nine pieces, [1] of which probably over ninety could be used against a passing fleet, fifty-six, or more than half, were of the very old and obsolete caliber of twenty-four pounders.

[1: There were some guns bearing inland and some flanking howitzers, besides those already enumerated.]

This inadequate preparation, a year after the attack upon Fort Sumter and the outbreak of hostilities, is doubtless to be attributed to surprise. The Southern authorities, like those of the National Government, were firmly possessed with the idea that the Mississippi, if subdued at all, must be so by an attack from the north. Despite the frequency of spies and treason along the border line of the two sections, the steps of the Navy Department were taken so quietly, and followed so closely upon the resolve to act, that the alarm was not quickly taken; and when intimations of attack from the sea did filter through, they had to encounter and dislodge strong contrary preoccupations in the minds of the Southern leaders. Only the Confederate general commanding the military division and his principal subordinates seem to have been alive to the danger of New Orleans, and their remonstrances had no effect. Not only were additional guns denied them and sent North, but drafts were made on their narrow resources to supply points considered to be in greater danger. A striking indication of the prepossessions which controlled the authorities at Richmond was elicited by Commodore Hollins, of the Confederate Navy. That gallant veteran was ordered to take to Memphis several of the rams extemporized at New Orleans. He entreated the Navy Department to allow him to remain, but the reply was that the main attack upon New Orleans would be from above, not from below. After the fleet entered the river he telegraphed from Memphis for permission to return but received the answer that the proposition was wholly inadmissible. Before the Court of Inquiry upon the loss of New Orleans, he testified that the withdrawal of his ships was the chief cause of the disaster. [2]

[2: Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Series I, vol. vi, p. 610.]

While the heavy ships were being dragged over the bar at the Southwest Pass, the mortar flotilla had entered the river under the command of Commander Porter. No time was avoidably lost, though there were inevitable delays due to the magnitude of the preparations that in every quarter taxed the energies of the Government. On the 16th of April, less than ten days after the Pensacola got safely inside, the fleet was anchored just out of range of the forts. On the 18th the mortar vessels were in position, and at 10 A. M. the bombardment by them began, continuing throughout the succeeding days till the passage of the fleet, and being chiefly directed upon Fort Jackson. From daylight to dark a shell a minute was fired, and as the practice was remarkably good a great proportion of these fell within the fort. As Farragut had predicted, they did not in the course of six days’ bombardment do harm enough to compel a surrender or disable the work; but they undoubtedly harassed the garrison to an extent that exercised an appreciable effect upon the fire of Jackson during the passage.

While the bombardment was progressing, the lighter vessels of the squadron were continuously engaged by detachments in protecting the mortar flotilla, steaming up above it and drawing upon themselves the fire of the forts. A more important duty was the removal of the obstructions that the enemy had thrown across the river, below the works, but under their fire. Opinions differed, both in the United States squadron and in the counsels of the enemy, as to the power of the ships to pass the forts; but it was realized on both sides that any barrier to their passage which should force them to stop under fire, or should throw confusion into their order, would materially increase the chances against them. Whatever the blindness or neglect of the Confederate Government, the Confederate officers of the department had not been remiss in this matter.

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