Why the North Lost the First Battle of Bull Run

Today’s installment concludes The First Battle of Bull Run,
our selection from The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, Volume 1 by Horace Greeley published in 1864.

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Previously in The First Battle of Bull Run.

Time: 1861
Place: Manassas Junction, Virginia

But the Confederates, who were somewhat the fewer at daybreak, fought under the encouraging stimulus of a knowledge that every hour, as it passed, added to their strength; that each railroad train arriving at the Junction brought fresh brigade after brigade to their support; and these, as they arrived, were hastened to that part of the field whereon their services could be most effective: while the Union men, who had been called to arms at two in the morning, and had generally thrown aside their knapsacks and haver sacks to facilitate their movements, had been fourteen hours marching — some of them on the double-quick for miles — or fighting, and were utterly exhausted and faint with hunger and thirst; while not a single company had been added to their numbers. Some regiments fought badly and had been demoralized and dispersed before the general catastrophe; but the great majority evinced a courage and devotion which, under favoring auspices, would have commanded victory. They gave way only when hope seemed dead — when the ever-increasing hosts of their foes not only outnumbered them in their front, but filled the woods on their right flank, exposing them to an enfilading fire, which they could not return with effect; and, their defeat once confessed, the confusion and panic of their flight are explained, not excused, by the fact that, owing to the long detour they had necessarily made in advancing to the attack, pursuant to the plan of battle, their line of retreat lay in part along the front of the foe, much of whose. strength was actually nearer to Centerville than they were when the fortunes of the day turned against them.

The causes of this disaster, so shamefully misstated and perverted at the time, are now generally understood. No one could, at this day, repeat the misrepresentations that for the moment prevailed, without conscious, palpable guilt and ignominy. The true, controlling reasons of the Federal defeat were, briefly, these:

1. The fundamental, fatal error on that side was that spirit of hesitation, of indecision, of calculated delay, of stolid obstruction, which guided all military councils, scattering their forces and paralyzing their efforts. Had any real purpose of suppressing the rebellion been cherished by General Scott, he never would have scattered the eastern forces along the line of the Potomac and Chesapeake, from Cumberland to Fort Monroe, divided into three or four distinct armies, under the command of militia officers who had never smelled burning powder unless in a squirrel hunt. His advance across the Potomac, after being put off as long as possible, was made, as we have seen, on May 24th.
2. The flagrant disobedience and defection of General Patterson, unaccountable on any hypothesis consistent with the possession, on his part, of courage, common-sense, and loyalty.
3. The failure of General Scott to send forward with General McDowell a force adequate to provide against all contingencies. The fact that twenty thousand volunteers remained idle and useless, throughout that eventful Sunday, in and immediately around Washington — Scott having obstinately resisted entreaties that they should be dispatched to the front; insisting that McDowell had “men enough”; that he needed no cavalry, etc. — of itself attests strongly the imbecility and lack of purpose that then presided over our military councils.
4. The Confederates were kept thoroughly acquainted by their friends, left in the Union service, with all that took place or was meditated on that side, and so were able to anticipate and baffle every movement of those armies. Thus, a military map or plan of the region directly west of Washington had been completed for the War Department barely two days before the Union advance reached Centerville; but, the movement being rapid, the Confederates left here many articles in their hasty flight, and, among them, a copy of this map, which was supposed to be un known to all but a few of our highest officers.
5. The fall, very early in the action, of General David Hunter commanding the Second or leading division, was most untimely and unfortunate. He was so seriously wounded that he was necessarily borne from the field. General Heintzelman, commanding the Third division, was also wounded, not as severely, but so as to disable him. General McDowell either had control of Runyon’s division, guarding his line of communication, or he had not. If he had, he should have ordered the bulk of it to advance that morning on Centerville, so as to have it well in hand to precipitate on the foe at the decisive moment; or, if he was so hampered by Scott that he was not at liberty to do this, he should have refused to attack, and resigned the command of the army, rather than fight a battle so fettered.
6. The original call of President Lincoln on the States, for seventy-five thousand militia to serve three months, was a deplorable error. It resulted naturally from that obstinate infatuation which would believe, in defiance of all history and probability, that a revolt of nearly ten millions of people was to be put down in sixty or ninety days by some process equivalent to reading the Riot Act to an excited mob and sending a squad of police to disperse it. Hence, the many prisoners of war taken with arms in their hands, in West Virginia and Missouri, had up to this time been quite commonly permitted to go at large on taking an oath of fidelity to the Constitution — a process which, in their view, was about as significant and imposing as taking a glass of cider. The Government had only to call for any number of men it required, to serve during the pleasure of Congress, or till the overthrow of the rebellion, and they could have been had at once. Regiments were pressed upon it from all sides; and the hotels of Washington were crowded by keen competitors for the coveted privilege of raising more batteries and fresh battalions.
7. It is impossible not to see that the Confederate troops were better handled during the conflict than the Union men. General McDowell, who had not participated in any former battle but that of Buena Vista, where he served as aid to General Wool, appears to have had very little control over the movements of his forces after the beginning of the conflict.
8. Although the Federal army, before that disastrous fight, was largely composed of the bravest and truest patriots in the Union, it contained also much indifferent material. Many, in the general stagnation and dearth of employment, had volunteered under a firm conviction that there would be no serious fighting; that the Confederates were not in earnest; that there would be a promenade, a frolic, and ultimately a compromise, which would send everyone home, unharmed and exultant, to receive from admiring, cheering thousands the guerdon of his valor. Hence some regiments were very badly officered, and others gave way and scattered or fled just when they were most needed.

This ends our series of passages on The First Battle of Bull Run by Horace Greeley from his book The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, Volume 1 published in 1864. This blog features short and lengthy pieces on all aspects of our shared past. Here are selections from the great historians who may be forgotten (and whose work have fallen into public domain) as well as links to the most up-to-date developments in the field of history and of course, original material from yours truly, Jack Le Moine. – A little bit of everything historical is here.

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