Confederate Victory at First Battle of Bull Run

Between the panic-stricken fugitives and the victors were undefeated units capable of disputing a southern advance. Between the panic-stricken fugitives and the victors were

Continuing The First Battle of Bull Run,
our selection from The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, Volume 1 by Horace Greeley published in 1864. The selection is presented in four easy 5 minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in The First Battle of Bull Run.

Time: 1861
Place: Manassas Junction, Virginia

[continuing quoted material from previous installment – JL]
Before 3 P.M. there had been fitful cannonading and skirmishing, but no serious engagement, on the left. But, when a defeat on the right became manifest, General Johnston again ordered General Richard S. Ewell to advance and attack, which he did, but was received by the Second brigade, Colonel T. A. Davis, with so rapid and spirited a fire of canister that he precipitately retreated. There were still more than three hours of good daylight when the Confederates saw the routed right rushing from the field, like frightened sheep, yet their pursuit amounted to nothing. They came across Bull Run, preceded by their cavalry, and seem to have taken a deliberate, though rather distant, survey of the Fifth division, drawn up in good order along the slope west of Centerville and eagerly expecting their advance. But they appear to have been aware that their victory was a lucky accident, and they did not choose to submit its prestige to the chances of another fray. Having gratified their thirst for knowledge, considerably out of musket-shot, they returned to their previous hiding-places in the woods skirting Bull Run.

During the fore part of the night some Union men, who had not been stampeded, went down toward the battle-field and brought away one or two guns, which had been abandoned in the flight, but not captured by the enemy. The Fifth division, constituting the reserve, now become the rearguard of the army, remained in position until after midnight; when, under orders from General McDowell, it began its deliberate retreat. Between the panic-stricken fugitives and the victors were not merely the reserve (Fifth) division, which remained in position, and had not fired a shot, but the First (Tyler’s) division forming our left, which had suffered little loss, but had signally repulsed the demonstration made upon it at the close of the fight; while the better portion of our beaten right and center, including the regular infantry and cavalry, still stood its ground and sternly faced the foe. Major Barry, our chief of artillery in the battle, in his official report, after noticing the loss of ten of his guns at the close, through the flight of their supporting infantry, says: “The army having retired upon Centerville, I was ordered by General McDowell in person to post the artillery in position to cover the retreat. The batteries of Hunt, Ayres, Tidball, Edwards, Green, and the New York Eighth Regiment (the latter served by volunteers from Wilcox’s brigade), twenty pieces in all, were at once placed in position; and thus remained until 12 P.M., when, orders having been received to retire upon the Potomac, the batteries were put in march, and, covered by Richard son’s brigade, retired in good order and without haste, and early next morning reoccupied their former camps on the Potomac.”

General McDowell reported our losses in this engagement at 481 killed and 1011 wounded but says nothing of how many wounded or others were taken prisoners. [1] General Beauregard reports his loss at 269 killed and 1533 wounded; in all, 1852; saying nothing of any loss in prisoners, of whom two or three hundred were taken by our soldiers in the early part of the battle and forwarded to Washington. He says he had sent 1460 wounded and other prisoners to Richmond. He adds: “The ordnance and supplies captured include 28 field-pieces of the best character of arms, with over 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, 37 caissons, 6 forges, 4 battery-wagons, 64 artillery horses completely equipped, 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, 4500 sets of accoutrements, over 500 muskets, and 9 regimental and garrison flags, with a large number of pistols, knapsacks, swords, canteens, blankets, a large store of axes and intrenching-tools, wagons, ambulances, horses, camp and garrison equipage, hospital stores, and some subsistence.” [2]

[1: “Among our killed were Colonel James Cameron, brother of the Secretary of War — of the Seventy-ninth New York (Highlanders); Colonel Slocum, and Major Ballou, of the Second Rhode Island; and Lieutenant Colonel Haggerty of the Sixty-ninth New York. Among our wounded were General David Hunter and General S. P. Heintzelman, commanding divisions; Colonel Oliver B. Wilcox, of Michigan; Colonel Gilman Marston, of the First New Hampshire; Colonel A. M. Wood, of the Fourteenth New York; Colonel H. W. Slocum, of the Twenty-seventh New York; and Colonel N. L. Farnham, of the Eleventh New York (Fire Zouaves). Colonel Wilcox was also taken prisoner, as well as Colonel Michael Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth New York (Irish), and Major James D. Potter, of the Thirty-eighth New York.]

[2: His statement of the number of muskets taken at “over five hundred,” including all those dropped by our dead and wounded, proves that the stories told by excited correspondents and other fugitives, of our men throwing away everything that could impede their flight, were gross exaggerations.]

At 7 A.M., Monday, the 22d, the last Union stragglers and wounded left Centerville, which a Confederate cavalry force was about to enter. But there was no pursuit, and no loss on our part after the battle, but of what our men threw away. Beauregard explains his failure to pursue, after the Union discomfiture:

An army which had fought like ours on that day against uncommon odds, under a July sun, most of the time without water and without food, except a hastily snatched meal at dawn, was not in condition for the toil of an eager, effective pursuit of an enemy immediately after the battle. On the following day, an unusually heavy and unintermitting fall of rain intervened to obstruct our advance with reasonable prospect of fruitful results. Added to this, the want of a cavalry force of sufficient numbers made an efficient pursuit a military impossibility.”

The forces actually engaged in this celebrated battle, so decisive in its results and so important in its consequences, were probably not far from twenty-five thousand on either side; [3] while the combatants actually on the battle-field, or so near it as to be practically at the disposal of the respective commanders, were, on either side, not far from thirty-five thousand.

[3: Pollard says, “Our effective force of all arms ready for action on the field, on the eventful morning, was less than thirty thousand men.” This was before the arrival of that portion of – Johnston’s army led to the field by Kirby Smith, or the brigade of Early — to say nothing of the reinforcements that were received during the day from the direction of Richmond.]

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