George Washington’s Important

Today’s installment concludes How the American Revolutionary War Ended,
the name of our combined selection from American Diplomatic Commission and John M. Ludlow. The concluding installment, by John M. Ludlow from War of American Independence, was published in 1876.

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Previously in How the American Revolutionary War Ended.

Secondly, he was convinced — and this conviction, it must be admitted, was shared by some of the strongest opponents of the war — that if the independence of the North American colonies were acknowledged, all the others, as well as Ireland, would be lost. If any one branch of the empire is allowed to throw off its dependency, the others will inevitably follow the example. “Should America succeed, the West Indies must follow, not in independence, but dependence on America. Ireland would soon follow, and this island reduce itself to a poor island indeed.”

Thirdly, he would not allow the Opposition to rule. “He would run any personal risk rather than submit to the Opposition; rather than be shackled by these desperate men he would lose his crown.” If he authorizes the attempt at a coalition (1779), it is “provided it be understood that every means are to be employed to keep the empire entire, to prosecute the present just and unprovoked war in all its branches with the utmost vigor, and that his majesty’s past measures be treated with proper respect,” i.e., provided the Opposition are ready to stultify themselves, and do all that the King thinks right, and admit that all for which they have contended is wrong. Before the spectacle of such narrow obstinacy it is difficult not to sympathize with an expression of Fox in one of his letters — “it is intolerable to think that it should be in the power of one blockhead to do so much mischief.”

Between these two men — it may be conceded, equally sincere, equally resolute — but the one reasoning, like the madman that he was to be, from false premises, self-deluded as to the feelings of his people, anticipating consequences which a century sees yet unrealized and the other with eyes at all times almost morbidly open to all the gloomier features of this cause, void of all self-delusion — the one conceiving himself justified in imposing dictates of his own self-will on every minister whom he might employ, entitled alike to chain an unwilling friend to office, and to shut the door of office to opponents except on terms of surrendering all their principles; the other always ready to accept the inevitable, to make the most use of the least means, to curb himself for the sake of his cause in all things except fearless plain-speaking — the one, finally resolved only to hinder the making of a nation; the other resolved to make one, if anyhow possible — the issue of the contest could not be doubtful, if both lives were prolonged. From that contest the one emerged as the mad king who threw away half a continent from England; the other as the father of the American nation.

The common consent of mankind has ranked Washington among its great men; and although the title may have been fully justified by the course of his civil life, whether in or out of office, after the termination of the War of Independence, it is hardly to be doubted that it would freely have been accorded to him had his career been cut short immediately after the resignation of his military command. Yet of those who have enjoyed the title, few, if any, have ever earned it by actions of less brilliancy. The fame of no conspicuous victory is bound up with Washington’s name. His one dashing exploit was the surprise of Trenton. His one victory, that of Monmouth, had no results; his most considerable battle, that of Brandywine, was a severe defeat. His greatness as a general consisted in doing much with little means, never missing an opportunity, rising superior to every disaster. When he had recovered Boston he could say, “I have been here months together with not thirty rounds of musket cartridges to a man, and have been obliged to submit to all insults of the enemy’s cannon for want of powder, keeping what little we had for pistol-distance. We have maintained our ground against the enemy under this want of powder, and we have disbanded one army and recruited another, within musket-shot of two-and-twenty regiments, the flower of the British Army, while our force has been but little if any superior to theirs, and at last have beaten them into a shameful and precipitate retreat out of a place the strongest by nature on this continent, and strengthened and fortified at an enormous expense.”

The character of Washington as a commander recalls in various respects that of Wellington. In both we see the same dogged perseverance under all the various phases of fortune; the same strict discipline, hardening readily into sternness, coupled with the same careful consideration for the wants and welfare of the soldier; the same patient, constant attention to every detail of military organization; the same ability in maintaining a defensive warfare against an enemy superior in force, with the same quickness to strike a blow in any unguarded quarter; the same unflinching frankness in exposing the evils of the military administration of the day. Many of Wellington’s dispatches from the Peninsula might almost have been written by Washington. The difference between them, while the war lasts, is mainly this: that in Wellington the soldier is all, while in Washington the statesman and the patriot are never merged in the soldier. Hence, while in after-life Wellington had to serve his apprenticeship as a statesman after ceasing to be a soldier, and often bungled over his new craft, Washington’s after-life was simply that of a statesman who had been called to take up arms and had laid them down again.

In short, though England had never a more successful foe than Washington, it is impossible not to feel, in studying his character, that no more typical Englishman ever lived.

Let us now cast a final glance at the state of the world at the close of the war. Except that an independent state had grown up for the first time since the downfall of Aztec and Inca empires on the American continent, and that England had been politically lessened, the balance of power had been little affected by the war. France had one West Indian island more, Holland one Indian settlement less. Spain had recovered Minorca and the Floridas. But she was irrevocably shut out from one great object of her ambition, the eastern half of the Mississippi Basin.

This ends our selections on How the American Revolutionary War Ended by two of the most important authorities of this topic:

• Report to Congress by American Diplomatic Commission published in 1782.
• War of American Independence by John M. Ludlow published in 1876.

American Diplomatic Commission began here. John M. Ludlow began here.

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