Sweden’s Choices on Norway

Coercion on the part of Sweden is inconceivable.

Continuing Norway Establishes Independence,
with a selection from Norway by Henry Seton-Karr. This selection is presented in 4 easy 5 minute installments. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

Previously in Norway Establishes Independence.

Time: 1905

The reply of the King to the manifesto and address of the Storthing was dignified and emphatic. He reminded the Norwegians that a union voluntarily entered into by the representatives of both nations could not be dissolved by one of them without the consent of the other. Not till the Riksdag had pronounced its opinion and sanctioned the separation could the Union be regarded as repealed. In his reply of June 10th to the President of the Storthing, he expressed his views still more explicitly, and justified his veto of the consular- service bill for Norway. In this document he demonstrated that, according to the Norwegian constitution, the right of the King of Norway to refuse his sanction to any bill of a single Storthing, if he considered the welfare of the realm to demand it, was absolute. To this rule there was no exception, however many times the Storthing might present its bill for the royal sanction. According to Section 79 of the same constitution, indeed, there was only one case in which a bill of the Storthing might become law in Norway even without the royal sanction, and that was the case of a bill which had been adopted, in its original form, by three successive Storthings, and was then presented for the royal sanction, and presented in vain. This unique case had not occurred. He pointed out, moreover, that it was not only his right but his duty, as unional King, to refuse his sanction to any measure adopted by one member, but concerning both members, of the Union, as in the present instance, without the consent of the other party to the existing contract. He had always endeavored, he added, to give Norway her proper place within the Union; but his duty toward the Union had compelled him, in this instance, to act even in opposition to the Norwegian people. He had had to choose between breaking his oath as a constitutional sovereign and risking a breach with his Norwegian councilors; and his decision could not, for one instant, be doubtful.

From the strictly unional standpoint these arguments appear to be absolutely unanswerable. Certainly the Storthing made no attempt to answer them from the constitutional point of view. On the other hand, from the purely Norwegian standpoint, it is obvious that the Storthing had the right to demand an administration from the King; and he had declared his inability, in the circumstances, to give them one. If Sweden and the Union could have been eliminated from the controversy, Oscar II. would certainly have been placed in an awkward dilemma; the Storthing would have gained at least a technical victory. But Sweden and the Union could not be so eliminated. Admitting to the full the force and justice of all Norway’s pretensions, admitting that an absolute royal veto was “incompatible with anything that goes by the name of national independence and constitutional autonomy,” as the leading Norwegian newspapers not unfairly argue, Norway was, nevertheless, as much bound by the Act of Union as Sweden was, and had no right to dissolve it of her own accord. In fine, the whole affair amounts to this: the young, expansive Norwegian democracy was cramped by the restrictions of a monarchical union; and the time had come for her to burst her bonds and go her own way.

But the separation need not have been a rupture. Had the Norwegians declared straight out that the Union had become inconvenient and oppressive, had they loyally invited the Swedes to cooperate with them in dissolving it amicably, there is no reason to suppose that they would have encountered any serious opposition from the sister state. Coercion on the part of Sweden is inconceivable. It is true that both by land and sea the forces of Sweden are vastly superior to those of Norway. Her eleven first-class warships would find little difficulty in blockading the four first-class Norwegian warships in their own ports; nor could her army, if she were in earnest, be prevented for long from occupying the Norwegian capital, though, no doubt, the Norwegians would give a good account of themselves. But the occupation of Christiania would by no means be equivalent to the conquest of Norway, to say nothing of the intense national feeling which any warlike operations on the part of Sweden would provoke.

How will the severance of Sweden and Norway affect international politics? Prejudicially, we fear. Diplomatists may henceforth have to deal with a Northern as well as with an Eastern question. To begin with, the political efficiency of Scandinavia will be seriously impaired. The hope of creating a barrier against Russian aggression was not without its influence upon the signatories of the Treaty of Kiel. Now, instead of a united and indivisible Scandinavian state, we shall have two independent nations, certainly with divergent aims, possibly with clashing interests. We must not forget that for years past Bjornson and his followers have loudly and frequently declared that they would rather break up the Union than allow Norway to be attracted within the orbit of Sweden’s foreign policy. The Union has been broken: the Norwegians now have it in their power to obstruct, if not to paralyze, Swedish diplomacy. But, admitting the exceedingly doubtful possibility of a permanent political agreement between Sweden and Norway in the future, the further question at once arises, Is Norway able adequately to defend her immense and rugged coast-line, and if able, would she be willing to do so? Certainly no Norwegian Government which imposed additional taxes for the express purpose of national defense could hope to retain its popularity for long. It is even conceivable that an alliance with Russia might be more popular in Norway than the expensive necessity of taking due precautions against her northern neighbor. So far, at all events, the Norwegian Radicals have ever exhibited a child-like confidence in the benevolence of the Czar. Altogether, the outlook is disquieting; and the disunited Scandinavian kingdoms may add to the growing embarrassments of European diplomacy.

Henry Seton-Karr begins here. Bjornstjerne Bjornson begins here.

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