Socrates on Suicide

“Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one’s self?”

Continuing The Last Days of Socrates,
our selection from Phaedo by Plato published in his middle/transitional period. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages. The selection is presented in eight easy 5 minute installments.

Previously in The Last Days of Socrates.

Time: 399 BC
Place: Athens

[Phaedo continues]
When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and Xantippe (you know her), holding his little boy and sitting by him. As soon as Xantippe saw us, she wept aloud and said such things as women usually do on such occasions, as, “Socrates, your friends will now converse with you for the last time, and you with them.” But Socrates, looking toward Crito, said, “Crito, let someone take her home.” Upon which some of Crito’s attendants led her away, wailing and beating herself.

But Socrates, sitting up in bed, drew up his leg and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed it said: “What an unaccountable thing, my friends, that seems to be which men call pleasure; and how wonderfully is it related toward that which appears to be its contrary, pain; in that they will not both be present to a man at the same time, yet, if anyone pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head.

“And it seems to me,” he said, “that if Aesop had observed this he would have made a fable from it, how the Deity, wishing to reconcile these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have succeeded.”

Hereupon Cebes, interrupting him, said: “By Jupiter, Socrates, you have done well in reminding me. With respect to the poems which you made, by putting into metre those Fables of Aesop and the hymn to Apollo, several other persons asked me, and especially Evenus recently, with what design you made them after you came here, whereas before, you had never made any. If, therefore, you care at all that I should be able to answer Evenus when he asks me again — for I am sure he will do so — tell me what I must say to him.”

“Tell him the truth then, Cebes,” he replied, “that I did not make them from a wish to compete with him, or his poems, for I knew that this would be no easy matter; but that I might discover the meaning of certain dreams, and discharge my conscience, if this should happen to be the music which they have often ordered me to apply myself to. For they were to the following purport: often in my past life the same dream visited me, appearing at different times in different forms, yet always saying the same thing. ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘apply yourself to and practice music.’ And I formerly supposed that it exhorted and encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, as those who cheer on racers, so that the dream encouraged me to continue the pursuit I was engaged in, namely, to apply myself to music, since philosophy is the highest music, and I was devoted to it. But now since my trial took place, and the festival of the god retarded my death, it appeared to me that, if by chance the dream so frequently enjoined me to apply myself to popular music, I ought not to disobey it but do so, for that it would be safer for me not to depart hence before I had discharged my conscience by making some poems in obedience to the dream. Thus, then, I first of all composed a hymn to the god whose festival was present, and after the god, considering that a poet, if he means to be a poet, ought to make fables and not discourses, and knowing that I was not skilled in making fables, I therefore put into verse those fables of Aesop, which were at hand, and were known to me, and which first occurred to me.

“Tell this then to Evenus, Cebes, and bid him farewell, and, if he is wise, to follow me as soon as he can. But I depart, as it seems, to-day; for so the Athenians order.”

To this Simmias said: “What is this, Socrates, which you exhort Evenus to do? for I often meet with him; and from what I know of him, I am pretty certain that he will not at all be willing to comply with your advice.”

“What then,” said he, “is not Evenus a philosopher?”

“To me he seems to be so,” said Simmias.

“Then he will be willing,” rejoined Socrates, “and so will everyone who worthily engages in this study; perhaps indeed he will not commit violence on himself, for that they say is not allowable.” And as he said this he let down his leg from the bed on the ground, and in this posture continued during the remainder of the discussion.

Cebes then asked him: “What do you mean, Socrates, by saying that it is not lawful to commit violence on one’s self, but that a philosopher should be willing to follow one who is dying?”

“What, Cebes, have not you and Simmias, who have conversed familiarly with Philolaus [1] on this subject, heard?”

[1: A Pythagorean of Crotona.]

“Nothing very clearly, Socrates.”

“I however speak only from hearsay; what then I have heard I have no scruple in telling. And perhaps it is most becoming for one who is about to travel there, to inquire and speculate about the journey thither, what kind we think it is. What else can one do in the interval before sunset?”

“Why, then, Socrates, do they say that it is not allowable to kill one’s self? for I, as you asked just now, have heard both Philolaus, when he lived with us, and several others say that it was not right to do this; but I never heard anything clear upon the subject from anyone.”

“Then you should consider it attentively,” said Socrates, “for perhaps you may hear: probably, however, it will appear wonderful to you, if this alone of all other things is an universal truth [2] and it never happens to a man, as is the case in all other things, that at some times and to some persons only it is better to die than to live; yet that these men for whom it is better to die — this probably will appear wonderful to you — may not, without impiety, do this good to themselves, but must await another benefactor.”

[2: Namely, “that it is better to die than live.”]

More information here and here, and below.

We want to take this site to the next level but we need money to do that. Please contribute directly by signing up at https://www.patreon.com/history