German Empire Proclaimed

Today’s installment concludes Unification of Germany,
our selection from Foundations of Modern Europe by Emil Reich published in 1908. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages.

If you have journeyed through all of the installments of this series, just one more to go and you will have completed a selection from the great works of four thousand words. Congratulations!

Previously in Unification of Germany.

Time: 1871
Place: Versailles,

Bismarck in 1866 had united the Northern States of Germany into the North German Confederacy; but the Southern States—Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden — were not yet combined with Prussia. It has been said that if his military success over Bavaria in 1866 had been as complete as his success over Austria, Bismarck might very well have forced Bavaria and other Southern States of Germany to join the North-German Confederation. In that way the Franco-Prussian War might have been avoided, and the unity of Germany secured in a peaceful manner, without the terrible loss in men and money entailed by that gigantic war.

It cannot be denied that in these arguments there are some elements of truth; and Bavaria might have been persuaded to join the North German Confederacy without the terrible war against France. On the other hand, Bismarck’s considerations were of a deeper and, on the whole, of a juster nature. He felt that the South German States could not be permanently held as members of a united Germany unless a great and successful war should put an end to any attempt at separation.

Moreover, those Southern States — in 1867 as well as in 1740 or in 1645 — were always coquetting with France, and had, by secular tradition and habit, a policy of friendship, nay, of alliance with the French. These old historical traditions and tendencies, Bismarck rightly felt, could not be efficiently combated by anything short of a successful war against France, in which the Bavarians too would be obliged to undergo the sufferings and accept the sacrifices necessary to the completion of the great plan. Bismarck, therefore, made no definite attempt at persuading the Southern States from 1866 to 1870 to join the North German Confederation.

The war between Prussia and France at once manifested the inner unity of the German nations; for the Southern States at once joined Prussia and the Northern States; and under the leadership of Moltke, of the Crown Prince Frederick, and of Prince Frederick Charles, the German armies invaded France, and in nearly every single battle worsted the French, even when, as at Gravelotte, the Germans had not a superiority of numbers.

At the first blush it appears inexplicable that the German generals, none of whom had seen or experienced a great war — except the war of 1866, which lasted only a few weeks-should prove so immeasurably superior to the French generals, every one of whom had gone through numerous campaigns previous to 1870. In fact, it must be said that in 1870 theory proved superior to practice; and the German officers, mere theorists, so to speak, undid all the plans, practice, and routine of the French generals. The explanation of this remarkable puzzle may be found in the fact that the experience of the French generals was great indeed, but it had been acquired, not in Europe and against European armies so much as in Mexico, in Algeria, in China; that is, against nations of a civilization and science inferior to those of Europe. The Germans were prepared for that war, and for more than two generations had studied its possibilities in minutest detail.

After the terrible disasters of Sedan and Metz came the siege of Paris. The French, maddened by their unprecedented reverses, accepted for a time the guidance of Gambetta, a man of energy and insight, but one who lacked the ruthless powers of an efficient dictator. He was able to create new armies, to offer to the Germans a resistance on the Loire and in the north of France which in many ways was more efficient than that offered to the Germans by the old regular army of France. The Germans, after October, 1870, were unable to repeat those wholesale captures of armies which characterized the first stage of their war with France; yet Gambetta was not quite equal to the different situation created in France through the German victories.

We now know, from German military writers, that the Germans could not have continued the war for another three months, after January, 1871. The winter was terribly cold; Bismarck, as he tells us himself in his memoirs, spent sleepless nights in apprehensions of international interference; the financial resources of Germany began to be exhausted, and a popular and implacable war, in the manner of the Spanish resistance to Napoleon, would have forced the Germans to retreat, and may have possibly deprived them of Lorraine, if not also of Alsace.

However, in France, as usual, there were strong parties filled with personal ambition, who, in the collapse of the old regime, welcomed an opportunity for raising themselves to power. Of these parties Adolphe Thiers was the head. He wanted peace, and peace by any means, for he knew that peace meant his own coming to power. He had been unsuccessful in his long and wearisome travels to the various courts of Europe asking for help and intervention. Bismarck—and that was his greatest diplomatic feat—had so completely isolated France that neither England nor Russia seriously thought of intervening. After the occupation of Paris, France was obliged to accept, in 1871, the terms of peace dictated by Bismarck at Frankfort-on-the-Main, by the terms of which France lost Alsace altogether, and of Lorraine the portion inhabited by German-speaking people; and, moreover, she was obliged to pay an indemnity of $1,000,000,000. The real cost of the war to France was $5,000,000,000, and but for the immense wealth of the country the war would have ruined it financially, as it did politically.

The Germans at Versailles — that is, in the very palace of Louis XIV, who in the seventeenth century had so deeply humiliated the Prussian Elector and the Germans generally — constituted themselves into the German Empire. King William of Prussia accepted the new dignity of the imperial crown rather reluctantly; and there were great difficulties about the title, which was finally settled as King William, German Emperor. Thus the great purpose of Bismarck, to bring about the unity of Germany by a successful war with France, rather than by negotiations and treaties with and between German sovereigns themselves, was completely realized; and Germany, which hitherto had been a lax and inefficient conglomeration of small and great sovereignties, was now launched on a career of political and commercial prosperity, and speedily became a world-power.

This ends our series of passages on Unification of Germany by Emil Reich from his book Foundations of Modern Europe published in 1908. This blog features short and lengthy pieces on all aspects of our shared past. Here are selections from the great historians who may be forgotten (and whose work have fallen into public domain) as well as links to the most up-to-date developments in the field of history and of course, original material from yours truly, Jack Le Moine. – A little bit of everything historical is here.

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