Bismarck’s Accomplishments

Bismarck had firmly seized the necessity of bringing about the unity of Germany under Prussian ascendency by the most careful conduct of Prussia’s foreign policy.

Continuing Unification of Germany,
our selection from Foundations of Modern Europe by Emil Reich published in 1908. For works benefiting from the latest research see the “More information” section at the bottom of these pages. The selection is presented in four easy 5 minute installments.

Previously in Unification of Germany.

Time: 1871
Place: Versailles,

The old question whether Athens made Themistocles or Themistocles made Athens is to the mind of many a historian an insoluble problem. However, we find that in any case of a really great man in history the possibilities of his career had long been prepared by the state or the nation to which he belonged. It cannot be denied that the influence of Bismarck after he came to power and to the enjoyment of the complete confidence of King William of Prussia was a decisive factor in the history of that country and of Germany. Yet it is equally certain that without the previous reforms made by such men as Luther, Melanchthon, and Brena, and the still greater literary and artistic lights of Germany, Bismarck’s genius alone could not have effected anything.

From the Revolution in 1848 to the end of the ’fifties Prussia was still held to be subordinate to Austria in point of influence in Germany; and an attack on Austria was not considered in any way as promising sure success for the Prussian army. At the same time the Prussian army, since the great defeat of Jena in 1806, had been reformed and improved and made a fighting-instrument second to none in Europe, and, as subsequent events have proved, superior to most.

When Austria in 1859 had been defeated by France, and had been deprived of most of her territory in Italy; when at the same time the uncompromising position of the Hungarians toward Austria rendered her interior security more than problematic a new view of the relation of the Danubian monarchy to Prussia was taken by Prussian statesmen. Of those men, Bismarck was even at that time the most important. He came from a small family in North Germany, and had to recommend him neither wealth nor remarkable personal connections. His strongest recommendation was his extraordinary political genius. All his measures were based on information regarding the persons and circumstances he was called upon to deal with, such as very few statesmen have ever used. In addition to a perfect knowledge of Prussia, and of the influential men and women of recent history, Bismarck had a rare insight into the general political state of Europe. He was master of the French language, and had also a surprising command of English; and when he was ambassador in Russia he acquired a working knowledge of Russian. Of the courts and the political situation of the Powers in Europe he had acquired from personal study and from a judicious course of reading such ample and accurate knowledge that as a rule he was better informed about the tendencies and character of political events than most men dealing with them directly or indirectly. Accordingly, he was seldom mistaken in the strategy of his actions, though at all periods of his life the wisdom of his methods was challenged, doubted, at tacked, and even ridiculed by men in important and commanding positions.

Bismarck had firmly seized the necessity of bringing about the unity of Germany under Prussian ascendency by the most careful conduct of Prussia’s foreign policy. He knew that the consummation of the great work could not be affected by introduction or academical spread of mere ideas. He knew it was preeminently a matter of diplomacy and war. He clearly indicated, in letters and speeches, that while some nations may bring about their national unity through treaties, or the slow work of mutual assimilation, the Germans, he rightly held, could not possibly realize their secular hope without establishing themselves as a great military power. This is the sense of his famous utterance that history is made by blood and iron. Nobody admired Cavour, the unifier of Italy, more than did Bismarck; likewise nobody acknowledged the surpassing merit of Francis Déak in bringing about the unity of Hungary in a peaceful way more than did Bismarck; but nobody saw more clearly that the problems with which Déak or Cavour had to contend, although identical in object with that of Bismarck, yet had a character so different that for their realization other means were required. As diplomatic reverses at home or abroad could never discourage him, even so the greatest triumphs in the field or in diplomatic negotiations were never able to beguile him into excessive actions. We must admire both his courage and his moderation.

His adversaries were numerous. It is well known that the Empress Frederick III, the daughter of Queen Victoria, was the persistent and implacable enemy of Bismarck; the historian Mommsen was likewise continually hostile to him; and it is certain that the great man lived in a world of incessant intrigues directed against his person and against his work. His greatest successes did not persuade the Empress Frederick that she was in error, and all his enemies and opponents were conspiring to shake the nerve of the Titan.

In addition to physical resources of the rarest strength, Bismarck, like most great men, had also an unusual amount of good luck. Like Richelieu and Mazarin, Bismarck could, under all circumstances, count on the unswerving attachment and friendship of his sovereign. Against this powerful friendship and steadfast confidence of the monarch all the shafts of envy and jealousy were hurled in vain. Not that the Emperor always shared the opinions or the desires of Bismarck; in fact, he was, in 1864, in 1866, and in 1870, very reluctant to accept the policy of his great minister. But in the end he consented to it.

The victories of the Prussians in 1866, the ascendency of Prussians in Germany since the day of Sadowa, were events the importance of which was clear to every statesman and diplomatist in Europe. Thiers, Edgar Quinet, and other politicians and public men of France pointed out clearly that Bismarck could not possibly rest on the laurels of his Austrian campaign; that he was necessarily striving to complete the unity of Germany, which in 1867 was yet far from complete.

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