From this time until the coup d’etat of February 8, 1913, there was no large organized resistance to the Madero Administration.
Continuing Mexico Plunged Into Anarchy,
our selection by William Carol.
Previously in Mexico Plunged Into Anarchy.
Time: 1913
Meanwhile, General Huerta, having “finished” his Chihuahua campaign in the autumn of 1912, was promoted to the rank of General of Division (Major-General) and decorated for his achievement. It was rumored in many places at that time that General Huerta was about to turn against the Madero Government. Madero, suspecting his loyalty, ordered him back to Mexico City. Huerta took his time about obeying this order, and, when he reported in Mexico City, obtained a sick-leave to have his eyes treated. Huerta was nearly blind when Felix Diaz’s revolt broke out in Vera Cruz in October, 1912, and probably thus escaped being drawn into that unsuccessful demonstration.
From this time until the coup d’etat of February 8, 1913, there was no large organized resistance to the Madero Administration, although banditism increased at an alarming rate in all parts of the Republic. The Diaz-Reyes outburst, in Mexico City on February 8, 1913, which resulted in the death of Madero and Suarez and the elevation of Huerta to practical military dictatorship, was brought about by the adherents of the old regime, who looked upon Madero’s extinction as a punishment meted out to a criminal who had raised the slaves against their masters. This view prevailed to a considerable extent in Mexico south of San Luis Potosi. In the North, however, the people almost as a whole (at least 90 per cent. in Sonera, and only to a slightly lesser extent in the other provinces) saw in it the cold-blooded murder of their political idol at the hands of unscrupulous moneyed interests and of adherents of the old regime of the days of Porfirio Diaz.
The resentment was general in the North–this new, largely Americanized North, Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila, organized the resistance in the provinces of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas, while Maytorena, the governor of Sonora, and Pesqueira (later in Washington, D.C., as Carranza’s representative), with Obregon as the head of their military forces, rapidly cleared that State of Federals, with the exception of the port of Guaymas. These fights were no mere bloodless affairs, but stubbornly contested, with heavy casualties, as a decided principle was involved in the conflict. Villa, the old bandit and personal enemy of Huerta, organized a force in Sonora, and Urbina did likewise in northern Durango. Arms, and especially money to buy them with, were hard to get. Funds were obtained from the tariff at ports of entry, internal taxation, amounting at times to practical confiscation, contributions, and gifts from various sources. It is said that the Madero family put aside $1,000,000, gold, for this purpose.
Though a few individuals went over to the Constitutionalist cause, the Mexican regular army remained true to the _ad interim_ Government. The revolutionists either held or rapidly possessed themselves of the great railroad lines in the majority of cases. Huerta, who is an excellent organizer, soon appreciated the magnitude of the revolt and rushed troops to the north as rapidly as possible, his strategy being to hold all railroad lines and cities with strong columns which would force the revolutionists to operate in the intervals between the railroads. Then Huerta, with these columns as a supporting framework, pushed out mobile columns for the destruction of the rebel bands.
The Carranzistas understood this plan and, to meet it, tore up all the railroads that they could and adopted as their fixed plan never to risk a general engagement of a large force. For the first few months, the rebels, who had adopted the name of Constitutionalists, continued recruiting their forces and destroying the railroads. The Federals tried to repair the railroads and get enough troops into the north to cope with this movement. They obtained new military equipment of all descriptions, the army was increased, and old rebels, such as Orozco and Salazar, sympathizers or tools of the old régime, were taken into the Federal forces as irregulars and given commands.
To understand the apparent slowness of the Federals in moving from place to place and their inability to pursue the rebels away from the railroads, some idea must be given as to their system of operating. The officers of the regular army are well instructed and quite competent. The enlisted men, however, come from the lowest strata of society, and, except in the case of a foreign war, have to be impressed into the ranks. They bring their women with them to act as cooks and to transport their food and camp equipage. Military transportation, that is to say, baggage trains of four-mule wagons and excellent horses for the artillery, does not exist in the Mexican army. In fact, when away from a railroad, the “soldaderas,” as the women are called, carry nearly everything; and they obtain the food necessary for the soldiers’ rations. A commissariat, as we understand it, does not exist. This ties the Federals to the railroads, as they can not carry enough ammunition and food for any length of time.
On the other hand, those who first saw Obregon’s rebel forces in Sonora and Villa’s in Chihuahua were surprised at their organization. There were no women taken with them. They had wagons, regular issues of rations and ammunition, a paymaster, and the men were well mounted and armed.
With Obregon, also, were regiments of Yaqui Indians, who are excellent fighting material. These forces were mobile, and could easily operate away from the railroad. They lacked artillery, without which they were greatly handicapped, especially in the attack on fortified places and on stone or adobe towns. As most of the horses and mules were driven away from the railroads, the insurgents could get all the animals they wanted.
The first large battle occurred on May 9-10-11-12th outside of Guaymas, between Ojeda’s Federals and Obregon’s Constitutionalists, at a place called Santa Rosa. The Federal advance north consisted of about twelve hundred men and eighteen pieces of artillery. They were opposed by about four thousand men under Obregon, without artillery. Eight hundred Federals were killed and all their artillery captured. The Constitutionalists lost two hundred and fifty men killed and wounded. Comparatively few Federals returned to Guaymas. Each side killed all the wounded that they found, and also all captives who refused to enlist in the captor’s force. This success was not followed up and Guaymas remained in the hands of the Federals. The artillery captured by the Constitutionalists had had the breech blocks removed to render them unserviceable; new ones, however, were made in the shops at Cananca by a German mechanician named Klaus.
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